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A bstract
This tlisscnulion cxammiM iho cstnblishmcnl and progress of C.G.Smith & Co. Uii. belwccn 
1910 nnd 1939. C.G.Smivh, Uic roimder, controlled Ihc firms lortuues during the pc-iod trnd 
Ihis illuslrotcs Ihc importance of entrepreneurs to » country’s economic growth and pros|*my. 
THc firm ranccniraicd nminly upon ibc sugar industry where it wits involved in both protlur- 
liiin and dislribution/wholcsoling. Smith's prospered bccqusc of Ihc protection which the in­
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Introduction
A number of historians have examined the South African sugar industry. The Industry prior lo 
1910 has been cxnmincil In some dcioll, with Pclcr Richardson providing on overview of the In­
dustry (I) and Maureen Tayal examining the labour component, [2| The industry after 191(1 
however has received scant attention, (3| with the exception of labour. [4j The history of the 
various businesser within the industry has received no independent academic attention and 
only two in-house historic* have been written. 1<) Hitherto, the standard work on CC.Smitb 
& Co. Ltd, has been R.F.Osborn's CO, /I Great lVotn/iM which provides a nai-raliro of 
C,fi,Smith'i life rather than a detailed study of fils business operations, (fi|
This dissertation examines the establisSmcui, adaption and progress of C.G,Smith & Co. Ltd. 
during the period 1910 to 1040. The me of the firm Is closely linked to its founder Charles 
George Smith who wus a whimsical but shrewd entrepreneur. The examination of the rise of 
such an entrepreneur mny be on a typical example of businessmen In general, precisely be­
cause he rose to the lop.
Sugar was a major international commodity in this period and the development of the South 
African sugar industry cannot be separated from the Inlc wi tonal context. Consequently de­
velopments in the international commodity trade, the foe"-1„ hnplcr I, had on effect upon 
the sugar industry. The Inter-war period was characterized by very slow growth in the 1920s 
and stagnation In the 1930s. International Intercourse was us a result increasing subject to 
both bilateral and multilateral agreements,
In Chapter 2 1 attempt to examine the performance of sugar wiiiiin the inlarnnllonul environ- 
men! at a time when it was confronted by tariff protection anti preferential access egr cements, 
in contrast to llie commodity trade In general, sugar experienced a price decline from 1920 un­
til 1937, This crisis led to the International Sugar Agreement of 1937 which was endorsed by 
all the producing and consuming nations.
How the South African sugar Industry responded to the international sugar Crisis is the topic of 
Chapter 3. South Africa became a net exporter of sugar In the period. Although its contribu­
tion remained insignificant in the irtlemnlioMl context; rising from 0,8 per cent of world pro­
duction in 1920/21 to 1,8 per rent In 1939/40. |7J Government intervention enabled the South 
African sugar industry to survive. The form this took and the effect this had upon the industry 
is discussed In the chapter.
The core of C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd business was sugar trading and this is the focus of Cltnptr 
4. The extent to which CG.Smilh’s personal friendships helped the business is examine 
gel her with his relationship with the Standard Bank, One of the questions which has to he ex­
amined is whether Smith's control of the firm Ibtoeghout the period was detrimental to the 
profitability of the firm. In particular, the diversification into non-sugar interests, that was 
motivated by his desire for new frontiers may have been harmful to the core business. Ho fol­
lowed a progressive poluv towards staff by introducing stock options and a pension scheme.
Two of the more in, sting ventures outside the core wholesaling operation was (he move 
Into direct sugar production when Smith's purchased the Umithrtkidu Sugar Company Limited 
and the Gledhow • Chnko’s Kraal Sugar Company Limited, the subject of Chapters 5 and 6. 
Solh of these ventures required much of Smith’s attention in tin totcr-war years with their 
ever pressing need of capilal and their serious management problem •
mcnt ill n lime when it was confronted by lurlff prolcclJpn nail prcfcrcnllul ucccm ngrecmcnls. 
lit c<imr«« to the cmiimoiliiy Iradu in general, sugnr experienced a 'ice decline from 1920 un­
til 1937. Tills crisis led lo the Inlernniionul Sugar Agrecmcnl of 1937 which wus endorsed by 
all the producing and consuming nations.
How the South African sugar industry responded lo the international sugar crisis is the topic of 
Chapter 3. South Africa became a net exporter of sugar in the period. Although its contribu­
tion remained insignificant in the international context; rising from n,S per cent of world pro­
duction in 1920/2) to 1,5 per cent In 1939/40. J7| Government intervention enabled the South 
African sugar industry to survive. The form this look and the effect this bud upon the industry 
is discussed in the chapter,
The core of C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd business was sugar trading and this is the focus of Chapter
4. The extent to which C.GSmilh's personal friendships helped the business is examined, to­
gether with his relationship with the Standard Bank. One of the questions which has lo be ex­
amined is whether Smith’s control of Die firm throughout the period was detrimental lo the 
profitability of the firm. In particular, the diversification into non-sugar Interests, that wits 
motivated by his desire for new frontiers may have been harmful lo the core business. He fol­
lowed a progressive policy towards staff by introducing stock options and a pension scheme.
Two of the more interesting ventures outside the core wholesaling operation was the move 
into direct sugar production when Smith’s purchased the Umzfmfculu Sugar Company Limited 
and the Glcdhow ■ Chuka's Kraal Sugar Company Limited, flic subject of Chapters 5 and 6, 
Both of these ventures required much of Smith’s attention in the inlcr-war years with their 
ever pressing need of capital and their serious management problems.
Smith's move into shipping was mi outgrowth of his whoiesi/tog «(VMlion nmi Is lliis wbjccl of 
Chapter 7. It pniwiteti on imcrtisling example of Smith's entrepreneurial skill in seeing a new 
opiJorliifiilyfOT jirUll.
CO,Smith's experience in the sugar industry wns only one example of the changes which were 
t liking place In I tie ngrleultunil sector In this period. Nevertheless CO,Smith stands out us one 
of the great entrepreneurs of the period who left his ntaik upon the South African sugar indtti-
1. Grave;, A & Richardson, P, 'Plantations in the Political Economy of Colonial Sugar Pro­
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'The Natal Sugar Industry in the 19th Century1, in Belnart, W.et al, Putting A Plougfi to 
the Ground, Johannesburg, 1986, pp.l29-17S,
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cial History flcriw, Vol,XIV, No.4, 1977, pp.519-547.
3. Barnett, R, The Natal Sugir fndtislry", unpubfuhed W.Kcon, UNISA, 1938; Bchrnmnn, 
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Ufliicriil)' of Nsiji), 1559; win dcr Mcrwe, "Die suikerindustriu van Natal/Zululand”, un­
published M A , University of Stellenbosch, 1939.
4. Beall, J, D & North-Coombes, M, D, 'The 1913 Disturbances in Natal; The Social anti 
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iCHAPTER 1 
The In ternational Economy and the  Commodity 
Trade, 1910-1940
fiitrotiucf/on
The inlcraollonnl ctonomy, bciv,-ecn 1910 and LMO, was subject to fundamunlal chanyj, from 
tebtivcly open Irade rclalionships lo lariff-prolectcd national economies wiihin the intcrno- 
lional setting. The commodity trade was adversely alTectcd by this changc and, in paniculur, 
primary products, whoso prices were falling throughout the world.
The international economy arises from the need for trade based on coroparalivc advantage, 
fntcrnationaf commodify inlcrdepcnilencc u I he ronscqticnce of:
1) The uneven geographical distribution nf physical resources, capital, enterprise and 
technical skill.
2) Varying population density and consumption habits.
3) Political boundaries. |lj
TTie Coramad/fj'Traite Pre-1913
Prior lo 1913, Europe dominated world trade, despite North America': increasing Importance. 
Europe's trade with the rest of the world Was characterized by an exchange of manufactured 
goods for primary products. The export trade in primary products trebled between 1876 and
1913. [2] The composition of this trn-Jc however changed towards ibc end of Ihc ccnlury due 
lo the rapid expansion of metal manutocl uring nnd Ihu increasing imports nee of minerals, 
Tlwrc 'vaj also o relative decline in the importance of foodstuffs nnd agricultural products. 
World trade in the period 1881 to 1913 grew by an average of 40 per cent per deende, |3j The 
relative regional position by 1913 can be Seen from the table below.
TABLE U






The problem for undeveloped rcgi mis prior to 1913 was to find a commodity which the Indus­
trialized nations required und then to sustain their position in world trade. According to
In trying lo grow by exporting primary products lo the core, the first tSfficuUy war thm 
l/ie core was not realty Importing a// that much. As wc have noted before, ihc com 
was more or less sclf svjpcioit in the primary raw materials of the industrial revolu­
tion, and what it lacked it obtained from the temperate countries of recent European 
settlement. |5|
The predominance of Europe in the international economy before 1913 was the result of in­
dustrialization. The integration of other regions into the inlernational economy crenfcd op­
portunities for export.led growth, which was taken op by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ar­
gentina, Chile, Urogcray, the Cold O w l, South Africa and South Eant Asiun countries.
Growth through primary commodity exports was often problematic; for example, cane sugar 
exporters were confronted with increasing beta sugar production in Europe.
Tire Commodity Trade: Inter-war Yuan 
(a) Overview
World War One gave a great boost to the production of primary commodities outside Europe, 
as Europe's own production of primary products declined; for example, sugar-cane cultivation 
and production row in Cuba and Java. The cessation of hostilities led to a post war boom for 
commodities extending through 1919 and into 1920. This surge then gave way to a crash in 
1920 and 1921 and to the collapse in the prices of primary products. In 1923 demand and 
prices temporarily recovered. Sugar was ; articularly affected, as European beet sugar produc­
tion was restored. Prices of primary commodities began to fall again in early 1925 and con­
tinued to decline until 1929, when they collapsed and remained depressed until 1933, (f>l 
World trade between 1929 and 1932, fell in value terms by f>0 per cent and Africa's foreign 
trade declined by 42 per cent. [7] The revival from 1933 led to a speculative boom during 1936 
and 1937, with a subsequent downturn, accompanied by falling prices, in 1938. Between 1928 
and 1938, there was a 60 per cent decline in the US. dollar value and a 9 per cent decline in 
the volume, of work! exports. 18} The problems of the primary commodity trade were ex­
acerbated by the fact (hat the twemy-im leading primary commodities in world trade in 1938 
represented only 30 per cent of (lie total value of world trade. J9J
The inter-war period saw a decline in the Importance of primary commodities in terms of their 
share of total exports, with the relative importance of food and agricultural exports conllnuiiig 
to decrease until 1937. The importance of minerals, also a primary product, however grew; 
while manufacturing retained its position.

British Commonwealth's share of world Irodc amounted to 29,3 per cent and the U.SA.’s to 
12,0 per ccnt, on average. In the period. Industrializet! Europe whilst losing ground between 
1928 and 1935, recovered to a large extent by 1938; although the trade in primary commodities
Couiiny
Spain & Territ. 
Portugal & Territ. 
United Slates (b)
Nolci a) United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, India 
& Burma.
b) Philippines, Panorama Canal, Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico & Virgin Is-
(h) ConmiixiHy Tmde Debulc
The problems nssodulcil wilh (irlraary eommodily production, irade and prices in the inter- 
war period, is lltc subjecl of considurablc debate in the literature. Aldcroft views ihc problem 
ns one of overproduction, ossocintud with the time lapse between initiol commitment and ac­
tual production. In support of this view, he cites the disparity between population growth and 
food production, 11 to 12 per cent versus 18 per cent, between 1913 and 1929. [14| Lewis in 
contrast, maintains thni the Industrial nations bought too little and too cheaply. [ISj Lewis 
Mgucs that the decrease in the population as a result of the war, combined with the decline in 
population growth and the decrease in international specialization in the 1930s, meant (hat 
trade was adversely affected, 116| Rweycmamu maintains that the problem Is the relatively 
sharp changes in demand and therefore in comparative advantage. Furthermore, there was a 
tendency for industrial nations increasingly to provide the important raw material* them­
selves. 117| Drun.mond views the problem as being linked to weaknesses in the inicrnation.i) 
financial system. There was uncertainty about fixed exchange rates, the basis upon which inter­
national trade was constructed.|!8| Forcmon-Peck argues that the financial system was flic 
major component in the problems associated with the primary commodity trade. The slocks 
of primary commodlllci which accumulated in the 1920s and the inabiiityto continue finaneing 
these stocks, also assisted to deepen the severity of the problem. (19! Whilst endorsing a view 
of the financial system as being at the heart of the problem, Kintilebefger ailrlbuios Ihc 
severity of the problem to the cessation of large scale investment in the norr-mdustrtolized na­
tions. In normal circumstances, declines in exports were accompanied by klcreascd borrowing; 
a decline in both spheres was catastrophic, |2Q| Furthermore, Ihc insbililyof non. 
Industrialized nations to purchase manufactured goods from the core, ieni momcfilum lt> s 
downward spiral In the international economy. The international commodify trade ms subjecl 
to fluctuating fortunes during the Inter-war years, there were declines in prices between 1921 
and 1923, and between 1925 or 1926 and 1933. A gradual improvement then occurred wilil 
1938, when prices again slumped.
i looking specifically at Tropical Africa, Munro argues for shifts in relative ndvontogc
ietcrioralcd from 1914 to 1922 nnd ihcn improved until 1925; after which ihcrc was no 
ecovery until 1945.121] Latham disagrees with Forbes Munro, with regard to (ho time peri- 
ids in which iho terms of trade either favoured or dlsndvatniigcd the primnry wmwodlly
i South African sugar Industry in contrast i
: of Sep with demand and this overproduction crisis
modity producers in the undeveloped regions, suffered a relative decline in income which 
hindered their investment in new technology and reduced their ability to buy industrial produc­
ts. la Ihe 19th Century the commodity trade had been an engine of growth for non- 
mdtiitriiiliscd natio/a f23|, but the focus changed in the inter-war period to technical innova­
tion, Technical muora'loo reduced costs and increased productivity through the introduction 
of high yield crop varieties anil more cflicicn! processing machinery. Lewis notes,
ciiji'itc o/growt/i is Kchnoioaka! chcnge; Inimiiulanal irotle cawc 
Ibis cxcept lit the Initial pcritxiof laying rfetvlopmm! fowi/folioiis, |24)
: pursued by two distinct methods.
1) Tnriff unif oiiicr proleci rve barkers moulded around counlrles and colonial
2) CommQdlty control schcmcs hy prociurers otI/i occasiowiJ governmental support.
TnrilTs, quotas, preferences and exchange control were Introduced by nation* lo prolccl them­
selves. The pcrcclved need for protection arose from the expcricneo of vulnerability during 
the First World War, Subsequent unemployment and the inslobrtiiy of primary commodity 
prices reinforced the ease. The itim of protection was to foster development and to provide 
strategic security. 1251
Britain implemented n system of Imperial preferences in 1919.|26] Preferences were granted to 
primary commodity Items such as bananas, citrus fruit, sugar, tnoloises, tobacco and wine. [271 
In view of the imperial preference granted to cane sugar in 1915, a subsidy to domestic beet 
sugar producers was introduced in March 1925. [28] Support for domestic producers was ex­
panded with the Introduction of (he Agricultv: ,il MarV -ling Act of 1931, which aimed at in- 
kbling morVcling schemes. The only schemo which actually came into operation in Britain 
w» lhai affecting hops. |29] The 1933 Marketing Act, superseded the previous act and in­
creased the reslrtaions on primary commodity imports. Schemes propagated under this act 
covered potatoes, pigs and milk, wtlh pWalocs the most successful. [Ml
Britain's preferential system was expanded as a rcsul) of I he 1932 Ollawa Conference, at which 
a live year agreement was signed between the United Kingdom and Die Dominions. The pref­
erence sjwcm had been limited to a few nations and the conference cxpnnded these benefits to 
the whole of the British Empire. In terms of the agreement Britain undertook
1) To conlmuu ihi ' i  • 'r<.in*-„~; already in operation.
2) To impose dutlo ur wliciil, maize, buucf, chucsc, cnnneil and dried fruil, copper,
Jmi), zinc, liosucd and rice, imported from non-sign lit ories.
3) To ri^ulalc the importation of meal in order to raise the price of meal In Britain 
ond thereby maintain efficient nnd profitable production.
•1) To continue to admit Empire products that previously had been allowed free ac-
5) To consolidate the preferences upon tobacco, wine and coffee.[31]
Furthermore, in terms of the Import Duties Act of 1932, Britain introduced a 10 per cent gen­
eral tnriff, with exemption for foodstuffs and raw malcrials. Protective duties were alio in­
cluded on manufactured items, amounting to as much ,ia 33 per cent. [32| These schemes 
stimulated Empire production of tropical products nnd aided price Stability, although British 
producers were not always protected. Preferential access ami (arifPs were a success in increas­
ing the colonial contribution to British imports., from 22 per cent in 1913 to 3d per cent by 
1938. (33| Foreign goods wfikh could enlcf Britain trcoly were rcduccd from 83 per ccnl to 
between 30 and 25 per cent, in 1932. |34| These measures may also have given foreign coun- 
tries new markets as i  result of the redirection of trade to within the commonwealth. |35| The 
various schemes undertaken by Britain, did not cover items which would have affected the cost 
structure of British manufactures, According to Forbes Munro,
Agricultural commodities which were Inilustrial rm/ materials hail no preferential ac­
cess to British or Dominion markets, because Oils multi add tlincliy to the costs o/
metropolitan manufactures. [36]
Other Western countries similarly optnd for protectionism, Belgium Instituted a policy of 
favoured access for primary commodities in 1924; France revised Its system in 1928. The
h Oovcrnmcm soughl to control agricultural imports when 
M of total Imports. |37] The United Slates also sought to pr 
. regulate trading relations by the Introduction of the Mawlcy-Smout Tariff on imports in
via, Lui'iuimiti, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Sivvtlcn, Brnz 
Stales, South Africa and the United Kingdom. [39) The International ueonoi 
from an open economy to tariff protected closed economies.
informally among producers or traders, to reduce or defeat
, producers, sometimes wit
reducing competilion and controlling production without inter-
rinc in 1928 and 1933; tin In 1921; wood pulp in
phosphate in 1933. [40) The aim was to stabilise prices within a given price range and to divide 
up the export markets. The major difficulty was to obtain co-operation from all parties, but 
even if this was attained, the problem of maintaining cohesion remained. Cartels in general, 
were seldom successful in either the short or longterm; with the exception of diamonds,
Commodity agreements In contrast were formal undertakings and covcrod commodities in 
which underdeveloped nations were tliy predominate producers. The first product to be sub­
ject to a commodity agreemcn' In 1931, and then in 1933 and 1937, Tea followed in
1933 nnd 1938, wheat in 1933, rubb r '-)34 and sugar In 1937. (41) These agreements nil had
us their objective the maintenance of lie supyi'y and demand curve, rather than simply a price 
range. This was facilitated by means of limits on acreage and or on output. Commodity agree­
ments were generally successful, in both the short and long-term, in providing market stability 
for the products.
Conclusion
The intcrnuiona! commodity trade between 1910 and 1940, was characterized by instability, as 
the supply of primary products tended to outrun the demand for them, Both governments and 
producers introduced control measures, with a varying degree of success, in an attempt to 
counteract this Instability. Trade however did not regain its former momentum, the prc-19W 
era of rapid growth being replaced by one of very slow growth in the 1920s and stagnation in 
the 1930s. Technological innovation became the main driving force within the international 
economy. International commodity interdependence exacerbated the problem for nations de­
pendent upon the trade to generate earnings, Survival within this setting was dependent upon 
adaptation and entrepreneurial skill, Sugar in particular, was effected by the problems associ­
ated with the international commodity trade in the inter-war period. Sugar is the focus of the 
subsequent chapters,
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CHAPTER 2
S u g a r ’s R o le  in  th e  I n te r n a t io n a l  C o m m o d ity  
T rade
il. Thcsugs
Uopical and sub-tropical zones. However, the Napoleonic
ji
/1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Siiyir Ueet
Europe 165 352 952 1856 3461 5410 6074
North America • • - 1 2 79 507
Total 169 352 952 1857 3463 5489 6581




Combined Totiil 1076 1725 2723 3832 5716 8385 12705
The rise of sugar-beet production in I he 19th Century can be ascribed to two factors. First, 
sugar-beet was an attractive alternative crop following the collapsc of international wheat 
prices from 1830. It could be utilized both for sugar and as a cattle feed. Secondly, beet pro­
duction expanded rapidly from 1850 as a result of the protection afforded it by the govern­
ments of Europe. Beet-sugor exports were promoted, as producers paid duty al the factory cal­
culated on the volume of beet, refunded when exported, but then calculated on the volume of 
sugar. Direct bonuses on bcet-sugar exports were paid from the 1890s. The German Treasury 
paid out 1,5 thousand million marks in export bonuses between 1840 and 1902; whilst the 
French spent 1,3 thousand million francs between 1884 and 1903. (2| Furthermore, the ex­
porter could sell bcet-sugar cheaper in a foreign country than in his own. As Chalmin states,
77ie paradoxical situation thus gecamd that sugar produced from European beet, 
was a luxury article (or almost) in the producing countries and al a time when its 
price was declining lit the consuming countries, lit particular the United King-
Sugnr-Ciine production hud been subjcci id lurmoil rollowine ihe abolitinn of slavery, com­
pounded by subsidised sugnr-bccl production. However, the rcducllon of occun rreighl roles 
by approximately 75 per ccnl between 18SI and 1902, to some exlcM enabled sugor-enne pro­
duction lo withstand the onslaught. [4] In 1902 sugar-cane production in Cuba and the Philip­
pines was encouraged by the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States which afforded thorn n 
tnrlff preference of 20 nnd 25 per cent respectively. [S|
The world demand for sugar had risen dramatically from 1 076 000 tons in 1850 lo 12 705 000 
tons by 1910. This Increase In demand had to u large extent been met through increased 
sugar-beet cultivation. The predominance of sugar-beet in world production can he seen from 
the following figures; fiO per cent of world production In 1890, 65,6 per cent in 1600 and 51,8 
per cent in 1910. The revival of sugar-cane from the low of 34,4 per cent of world production 
in 1900 In 48,2 per cent by 1910, was the result of the reduction in ocean freight rates and the 
Qrusseii Convention rather than innovation within the sector itself.
The Brussels Convention of 1902 attempted lo control sugar-beet production fostered by the 
bounty system and inadvertently allowed sugar-cane favourable trailing conditions. The 
participants in terms of the convention agreed to the following;
1) The suppression of all direct and indirect bonuses from September 1903.
2) The constant supervision of factories and refineries.
3) The limitation of the surcharge.
4) A special duty on Imports of subsidised sugai, with a lower rate to signatory 
states. (61
The five year agreement was initially signed by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, In 1907 Ihe conven-
(ion was exlcntlcd for a further five years imd quoins were inlroduccd, Russia also bccomc n 
signnlory. Tiic convention win again renewed in 1912 although the United Kingdom withdrew. 
Tlie advent of World War One however nullified the agreement.
Sugar Productions Inter-war Years 
(a) Overview
World War One led to the disruption of Europe's sugar-beet industry which stimulated sug .-- 
cane production. The demand for sugar-cane was met by the expansion of production through 
increased acreage, particularly in Cuba. The cessation of hostilities led to a gradual recovery 
of sugar-beet production and to a situation in which supply outran demand.
Sugar prices fell dramatically in the inter-war years. Prices fell by over 90 per cent between 
1920 and 1922. |8| By 1925 the price had fallen below £14 per ton, The price declined further 
in 1927 to 13s.0d. per cwt, Cs.3,75tl. by 1931 and 4s3,5d. in 1934, [9) Between 1928 and 1935 
the annual average price per cwt fell from lls.7,5d. to 4s.8d. |10| It was only in 1937 with the 
prospect of a successful international agreement that the price rose to ds.Od. per cwt, an in­
crease of 20 per cent, [11| International sugar prices in contrast to Ihe commodity trade in gen­
eral, experienced a price decline from 1920 until 1937 when prices showed a gradual improve­
ment. This decline in sugar prices was the result of the overproduction crisis which plagued 
the international sugar trade curing the inter-war period.
The crisis v.jt compounded by the following problems: First, the U.S.A. and Britain, the 
worlds major sugar consumers, both had preference restricted markets during the inter-war 
period. By 1937, 06 per cent of world exports were subject to preference agreements, (12] 
Secondly, the desire for national self-sufficiency led to imported sugar being replaced by
domestic production in Austrin, Australia, China, Egypt, Estonia, Eire, India, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Sweden and Turkey, Thirdly, the nations which relied in purl or wholly on the open 
market were placed in an increasingly difficult position because of the preference agreements, 
in particular Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Java, Peru and the 
U.S.S.R. These factors led to numerous attempts at price stabilisation through restricted pro­
duction and market division, These attempts were given substance in numerous international 
agreements which will be examined in detail later in the chapter,
By the 1920s the U.SA. was the largest importer of sugar, absorbing 40 per cent of world im­
ports. 113] However I his figure is however misleading as over 99 pur cent of these imports 
originated from areas which enjoyed preferential access to the USA. market.
TABLE 2.2 







The U.S.A. instituted a preference system on sugar in 1876 when sugar from Hawaii was 
granted free admission, Puerto Rico followed in 1901 and the Philippines in 1915. Cuban 
sugar was granted a 20 per cent preference under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902. The T ariff 
Act of 1930 gave protection to sugar produced in the U.SA., Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philip­
pines and tlie Virgin Islands. In 2931/32 Ibis legislation reduced the Caban share of the 
U.SA. market by 20,2 per cent. The Joncs-Costigan Act of May 1934, attempted to organise 
sugar supplies by Introducing a system of quotas. Compensation was paid to domestic pro­
ducers for any losses suffered as a result, In June 1934 a presidential proclamation reduced
' . x v'y
ihc general loriff on sugar from 2,5 cuius io 1,8 ccnls per pound oml lowered (he duly on 
Cuban sugar from 2 ccnls io 1,5 ccnls. 115) In September, Cuba wns granted further relief by 
[lie Cubon-Amcrlam Trudc Agreement which reduced the duty on sugar from 1,5 ccnls to 0,9 
cents per pound. (16) The cffcctivcnc&s of the reduction in duty wns limited by the Imposition 
of i  quota of approximnlcly 2 000 short tons. This was Half the amount of Cuban sugar im­
ports in Ihc mid-1920s. |17] In 1937 the Jones-Costigan Act was revised but the principles 
remained Ihc same. |18| The American market was governed by preferential access und this 
did not help to solve the world sugar crisis,
British anmi.il sugar consumption per capita increased by 13,4 lbs. between 1900 and 1937. 
There was a temporary decrease in consumption amounting to approximately 21,2 lbs per 
enpita, per annum during the First World War end the early 1920s as a result of supply prob­
lems and high prices. The consumption of sugar then increased to 87,8 lbs. per capita, per an­
num between 19W and 1929. In the 1930s consumption increased to 98,1 lbs. per capita, per
Britain granted an imperial preference of 4s,3d. to cane-sugar in 1919. The proportion of 
Empire sugar to total imports rose as a result to 28 per cent, with Mauritius contributing 16 
per cent, the British West Indies 9,3 per cent and South Africa 2,4 per cent. [20] The reduc­
tion of the preference to Is,lid. In 1924 reduced these contributions; but in 1925 the prefer-
. of loin! imports, (Muurilius 13,3 per
i in Empire sugar imports to 32 per <
nglhcncd in
nics nnd dominions bclwccti 1934 and 1938, compared lo only 28 |
helped lo stimulale sugar produelion in
The domestic industry was also foslcrcd with I tie introduction of a subsidy to domestic beet 
producers in March £925. This encouraged domestic production which reached 605 thousand 
Ions or one-fifth of total requirements by 1934/1935. [25] However the production of beet was 
limited in 1936 and the Industry was reorganised with the amalgamation of all the factories
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The (wo graphs illustrate ihc overall picluvc of world sugar import; and exports bclweun 1909 
nnd 1938. Sugar production peaked at 142%000 short tons in 1924/28 and then dcdiucd to 
12 543 000 tons by 1534/38, The dominance of the U.SA. and U.K. is apparent. The U.S.A.'s 
imports grew from 3 095 000 short tons in 1909/1913 to 4 814 000 short tons in 1934/38 and 
the U.K.'s l>pm 2 330 000 short Ions to 2 898 000 short tons. World exports for the open 
market, that is non-preference, decreased from 4 060 000 short tons to 2608 000 short tons. 
The nations grouped under the heading, "becoming sclf-sufficicnt", namely Austria, China, 
Egypt, Indio, Sweden end Turkey, decreased their Imports from 2 028 000 short tons in 
1924/28 lo 438 000 short tons In 1934/38. South Africa's contribution to world sugar produc­
tion in ll'c period was insignificant, although it did rise from 03 per ccnt in 1920/21 to 1,8 per 
cent in 1939/40. |26] The overproduction crisis which sugar Diced in the Inter-war period was 
only solved with the 1937 agreement.
(h) International Agreements
There were repeated attempts to stabilize the International «ngar market hy means of restric­
tion agreements in the Inter-war years. Five major agreements were negotiated between 1927 
and 1937. The failure of four of these, (the 1927 Paris Agreement, the League of Nations En­
quiry, the 1929 Brussels Agreement and the 1931 Chadbourne Agreement) can be ascrlljed to 
the Inability of the industry to obtain both governmental and producer co-operation on a 
world-wide basis. The continued downward spiral of prices eventually led to a change In per­
ceptions and to a desire for a comprehensive international agreement, This culminated in the 
1937 International Sugar Agreement which succeeded because it enjoyed the universal co­
operation of both producers and governments, The agreement brought stability into the inter­
national market with a reduction of 18 per cent in world exports compared to the average be­
tween 1924 and 1928, |29|
Czcchoslmkio, Poland and Germany would co-opcr
They would obtain ilic co-opcrnllon of other sugar uxporlcrs.
Planting would lx regulated from tlic 1928-2
The agreement was iniciofly signed by Cuba, Czcc/iosiarakla, Germany <ind Potoml, subjed io 
ralific.itlon In Berlin during November 1927. Belgium became a signatory on the 26th Decem­
ber 1027, However the rejection by Java of the Paris Agreement meant Ihot Cuba had failed
crisis, Cubaaltcmptc
which proved fruitless and highlighted the fallacy of the European viewpoint, The agreement 
was the first attempt to restrict production and :
In the inter-war period,
vivo the agreement by a unilateral restriction of four million i
consumption on a International basis
(2) The Leuguc nfNallons Enquiry
In Jimc 1928 following rcprcscnliitions from the sugar industry, the Economic Cof"diicc of 
Ihc Lcnguc of Nations, undcvlook a study of the production, consumption ond the inliimuiion- 
a! trade in sugar. The main points raised in the representations mode to the committee were:
1) There was a need for an international agreement between all producers with the 
aim of sluiiilising production,
?.) Exporting countries should endorse a rational trade policy with regard to sugar.
3) There should be a campaign to Increase consumption,
4) Governments should reduce cxcisi; duties.
2) The establishment of a central bureau to monitor sugar, }31|
The Committee issued its report on 4th July 1929 but was not prepared to prescribe to nations. 
!l offered only ihc following tentative conclusions:
1) The difficulties would remedy themselves or be remedied by those engaged In the
2) The Committee reached no conclusions on Ihc rchtirc merits of lire various 
proposals pul before it.
3) Individual slates gave no consideration to the effect of bi-lateral agreements on Hie 
world trade In sugar,
4) The tine had possibly come for joint action.
5) The Committee would coni'nuc to monitor the sugar question.
6) Individual governments show- be approached with regard to the Issue of lowering 
excise duty, |32]
The League's report highlighted the inability of an international organisation which relied 
purely on consensus to provide a solution to the problems of the international sugar trade. An 
agreement concluded with the consent of all sugar producers and consumers was the only solu-
(3) The 192*1 Brussels Agreement
An informal meeting of sugar exporters was convened in Geneva between 4th and 6lh April 
1929. The meeting was attended by Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany and 
Poland. The following proposals were made:
1) A pool be formed for sugar produced by participants Sir export.
2) If dumping was practised by other countries, the above parties would attack these 
countries In their own markets.
3) To oppose depression of world prices and form a front amongst exporting coun-
4) The representatives would meet again in BrusscL .  ;-r consulting their respective 
industries. |33]
Following consultations with their respective industries, the participants met again in Brussels 
from the 29th June to 4th July 1929. The Cuban delegation disassociated itself from point two 
of the April proposals and it was removed from the agreement, in terms of the agreement 
signed on 2nd July 1929 the participants agreed to the following:
1) The restriction of exports for four years to the following: Belgium 60 00(1 tons; 
Cuba 5 000 000 tons; Chechoslovakia 825 000 tons; Hungary 100 000 tons; 
Germany 200 000 Ions and Pofamf 383 000 tons,
2) The exportable quantity of sugar limited to that fixed in terms of the agreement,
The League's report highlighted Ihc inability of an international organisation which relied 
purely on consensus to provide a solution to the problems of the international sugar trade. An 
agreement concluded with the consent of all sugar producers and consumers was the only solu-
(3) Ttie 1929 Brussels Agreement
An informal meeting of sugar exporters was convened in Geneva between 4th and 6th April 
1929. The meeting was attended by Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hunpuy, Germany anti 
Poland. The following proposals were made;
1) A pool be formed for sugar prodt/eed by participants for &*pt>rt.
2) If dumping was practised by other countries, the above parties would attack these 
counlrito in their own markets.
3) To oppose depression of world prices and form a front amongst exporting coun-
4) The representatives would meet again in Brussels after consulting Ihtir respective 
industries. [331
Following consultations with their respective industries, the participants met again in Brussels 
from the 29th June to 4th July 1929. The Cuban delegation disassociated itself from point 'wo 
of the April proposals and it was removed from the agreement. In terms of the agreement 
signed on 2nd July 1919 the participants agreed to the following;
1) The restriction of exports lor four years to the following: Belgium 60 000 tons; 
Cuba 5 000 000 tons; Czechoslovakia 825 000 tons; Hungary 100 000 tons; 
Germany 200 000 tons and Poland 3S3 000 Ions.
2) The exportable quantity of sugar limited to that fixed in terms of the agreement.
3) A common cllorl 10 obloin I he mlhcrcntc of «hcr producers.
4) The fbrmallon of s pcmaacnl commklcc to monilor Ibc agrccmcnl nnd lo foslcr 
incrcnscd consumpiion,
5) Violulions subjecl lo fines or compensation of other signatories. |34] Success 
depended upon obtaining the participation of the other major sugar exporters. 
The failure to convince Java, Peru and the Philippines to become signatories meant 
that the agreement was again stillborn.
(4) The 1931 Chaiibourne Agreement
An international agreement, if it was to succeed, required the participation of both Cuba and 
Java. The instability of sugar prices in the world market led to preliminary discussions being 
held in Amsterdam between Cuba and Java in 1931. They then proceeded to Brussels and 
were joined by representatives from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany and Poland. 
This meeting led to the signing of the Chndbournc Agreement on 9th May 1931. In terms of 
the agreement!
1) The export quotas were fixed for five years, Cuba agreed lo average exports of 
805 000 long Ions per annum excluding the U.S.A.; Java 2,5 million metric tons; 
Belgium 30 275 metric tons; Czechoslovakia 570 877 metric tons; Germany 350 000 
metric tons; Hungary 84 100 metric tons and Poland 308 812 metric tons.
2) Production not to exceed focal consumption and exports combined, with surplus 
stocks to be eliminated in the course of the agreement.
3) The creation of a International Sugar Council lo supervise the agreement,
4) The quotas to be increased proportionately if the world price exceeded 2 cents 
(US.) per pound (U.K.).
5) An attempt to be made lo obtain the agreement of other countries. |351
Subsequently, Peru and Yugoslavia bccamc slguulorics. Export pricos continued to decline
mid lhe signutories limited exports accordingly. However the scheme failed to prevent a drop ]
in the sugnr prim as major producers such as Hawaii, the Philippines and British colonies were
not party to ihe agreement. The open market price of sugar dropped from Gs,3>75d, in 1931 to i
4«.3,5d. in 1934. |3<i| By 1933 the U.K., Japan, Portugnl, France, USA. and their possessions (
exported more than the signatories of the agreement. |37| The agreement expired In August ;
1935 and was not renewed. As Rowe notes.
Failure of l/ie Chadboumc A&cancru relates la Ihe fai/wrt it? miss prices, reficaim of 
Vic real (rouble, namely the increase in production outside the agreement, which more 
!hm muldscii the rcducal production of the countries within it. [38)
(5) The 1937 International Sugar Agreement
in 1933 the problem of the marketing and production of primary commodities was discussed at 
the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London. As a result of these talks, the 
signatories of the Chodbourno Agreement together with the USA. and U.K. were invited to 
London In March 1934, lo hold discussions regarding the international sugar trade. It became 
clear from this meeting that two issues had to be revived before an international agreement 
could succeed, The uncertainty surrounding American sugar policy, subsequently solved by 
the passage of legislation in 1934, Secondly, the perception by signatories of the Chadboume 
Agreement that another accord would not achieve an equable market division. The latter 
problem was eventually overcome by the fluctuating nature of the sugar market and by the in­
terest displayed by the U.SA. and the U.K. in a conference.
An irtcrnnllomil sugar confcrcncc wiis held in London, In April 1937. It was Ihc first lime ihol 
nil Ihc mujor producers nnti consumers of sugar intended a confercnce and reached an agrc-.- 
ment. In lernis of llie agreement li wits resolved Ihnl:
1) The consumers tu hu assured ol nn adequate supply of sugar ol u reasonable price.
2) The increased consumption of sugar lo be encouraged.
3) The free market for sugar was lo be maintained and expanded.






5) Th: stocks not to exceed 25 per cent of a country's annual production.
6) The establishment of an International Sugar Council to administer the agrce-
Thc agreement was signed by Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Haiti, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, U.K., U-SA., U.S.S.K,, South Africa and Yugoslavia. The agreement was only eon- 
corned with sugur traded in the free market and did not affect bilateral agreements. The 1031 
accord was the first to whivh all major parties within the international sugar trade subscribed 
and was born out of the net for order and price stability within the trade.
20 OfH Ncihcrfafids 1050000
GO 000 Portugal 30 000
940 000 Peru 330 000
250 000 Poland 120 000
41X3 000 US&R. 230 000
32 500 Tnml 3 Ii22 SIM
Conclusion
The inlcvnalionul sugnr irndo was chnraclcfiscil by instability between 1910 and 1940. This 
was tnnde worse by the restricted itcccss to the major markcln of the U.SA, nnd U.K. The In- 
cnstisiug sulf-sufliciency of numerous countries mcaot that those wholly dependent upon the 
open market fneed a deepening crisis. The numerous attempts to control the market tailed 
until 1937 wlien universal co-operation was obtained from both producers and governments. 
Stability required strict control and did not allow for the free play of economic forces. South 
Africa, the focus of the next chapter, survived in this market because of its captive home 
mtirkct and government assistance combined with preferential access to the British and Cana­
dian markets.
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CHAPTERS
South Africa as a  Sugar P roducer
Inlrnduulion
Since 1910 (he quanlitalivc significance of agriculture in Ihc total economy has been red need. 
Agricultures' contribution to the Gross Domestic Product declined by 4,7 per cent between 
1920 and 1940, from 21,3 per cent to 111,6 per cent, During the same period mining’s contribu­
tion declined by 5,8 per cent, secondary Industry’s contribution increased by 6,6 per cent nnd 
services’ contribution increased by 3,9 per cent.
TABLE 3.1 
Composition ofG,D.P_ 1920-1940 |l|
(Constant 19% Prices)
Year Apiculture Mining 4  Secondary Senices
Quarrying Industry
1920 243 19,3 9,5 46,4
1925 22,2 20/1 10,1 47,3
J930 23,4 19,1 10,7 46,8
1935 22,2 14,9 14,4 4&S
1940 19/5 14,0 16,1 50,3
In contrast to agriculture’s decline in terms of G.D.P., the gross value of the contribution of 
sugar-cane production to total ngricuiturc increased from 3,7 per cent in 1911 to 10,9 per cent 
in 1940. In the same period South Africa changed from being a net importer to a net exporter 
of sugar and this resulted in sugar’s increased importance within the agricultural sector.
TABLE 3.2
Tbt1 Cross Valuu of Suynr's Conlrlimllmi (o Agrlculiure, IVU-liMO, Yciir Ended 30 Jnnu |2|
Year Sugar Total Sugar %
1915 1 326 34 752
1920 3 516 70 010 5,0
1925 2 772 58 570 4,7
1930 4 358 48 790 8,9
1935 5 036 50 728 9,9
1940 7 692 70 800 10,9
Tlie Snisar Industry! Clreu 1910
The expansion of cane acreage and production between 1860 and 1909 was linked to n large 
cxlcnt to the economic fluctuations In southern Africa. (3) The acreage under cane Increased 
from 15 088 acres in 1868 to 52 187 acres in 1908 and the sugar produced from 9 174 to 31 537 
long tons In the same period. [4j The land area available for cultivation was further Increased 
with the opening of Zuluiand for cane growing by the government in 1905.
There were 75 mills In operation in 1877 but this decreased to 30 in 1900. |5| The reduction in 
the number of mills was in response to economic conditions and the increased capital require­
ments which resulted from technological progress. This trend was enhanced by the formation 
of the large sugar planting and processing concerns which still dominate the industry; the II- 
lovo Sugar Company in 1890, Reynolds Brothers Ltd. and J.L. Hulell and Sons in 1892, and 
the Tongaat Sugar Company In 1894.
The sugar industry with a very high ratio of labour to capital was dependent upon large 
quantities of cheap and reliable labour for its prosperity. Indentured Indian labourers were In­
troduced to Natal in I860 and by 1911 when indentured immigration ceased, a total of 152 184 
labourers had entered Natal. |6| Indians were predominant in both the cane fields and mills. 
Indians constituted on average 68 per cent of the total labour force in the fields between
11175/75 nm) 1907/08. [7| In 1901 the milliiiji idor employed n loin! of 9 460 individuuls of 
which 8 747 were Indians, 522 were Africans and 161 were Euir peans. |S] Labour was one of 
the key element: in the sugar industry and Indian labour was the key component of the labour
In the 19th Ccutury Natal was unable to absorb all the sugar produced and exports were of 
major importance to the viability of the industry. The Cape absorbed 50 per cent of Natal 
sugar exports between I860 and 1900 [9|, when Natal exports rose from 1. 218 long Ions to 
411000 long tons. [10] The Natal sugar industry experienced considerable competition in the 
South African market in the 1880s and 1890s. After 1900 Mauritian sugar was still landed at 
Durban for 12,5 less than the local selling price. [11| The dumping of sugar also posed n 
threat to the Natal market, German bcel-sugar in the 1890s and Australian and U.S.A. sugar 
alter 1900. Mozambique, as a result of its concession agreement concluded in 1909, was able 
to gain duty-free access to the Transvaal market.
The colonial government granted the industry minimal protection and customs duties were lin- 
prscil for the exchequer rather than for the protection of the industry, In 1886 the duty on im­
ported sugar amounted to 8s.4d. but in 1906 this was reduced to 3s.6. at a lime when the indus­
try was facing increased competition from overseas. [12]
The sugar industry of Natal prior to 1910 was characterized by insecurity, This insecurity led 
to the increasing consolidation of the industry within the ambit of large companies which could 
withstand the nucleating nature of the sugar market and the economy in general. In 1910 the 
Industry had a capitalisation in excess of one million pounds and the large companies held ap­
proximately 55 688 acres of land. (13| It would appear that these concerns were able to domi­
nate the industry because of their access to large amounts of capital through their share issues.
«f -a -ve
Hie Sugar Induslryi 1910-1939
(a) I’niiiiicllnn
South African sugur produclion increased by 726,2 per con!, from 82 000 ions in 1910 lo 
595 5; i. s in 1939. The formation of the Union in 1910 had provided the industry with an 
assured morfcel and this led to an increase in production of 83,2 per cent between 1910 and 
1918. This enptive market allowed the industry io continue to expand its production in ihe 
1920s and " . <cn sugar was confronted by a world wide overproduction crisis.
Sugar production only declined on six occasions in the 39 year period and these reductions 
were all linked to natural disasters. In the 1913/14 season there was a 4 per cent reduction as a 
result of drought and the Indian strike. [14| fa (917/18 floods resulted In a 8,5 per cent reduc­
tion In production. 115| Drought ayain led to declines In production of 24,1 per cent in 
1920/21, 20,7 per cent in 1J24/25 and 17,1 per ccnt In 1931/32. [16] A red locust Invasion be­
tween 1933 and 1935 led ton decrease in production of 8,3 per cent Inti 1934/35 season. |17J
The ncrcagc under sugar-cane increased 3,6 limes between 1911 and 1940, from 107 091 acres 
lo 383879 acres. The largest Increase occurred in the five year period between 1916 and 1920 
when 47 S26 acres were addef, in Increase of 44,7 per ccnt. This was the period when world 
demand was increasing and -rices were high. For the entire period, the average five yearly in­
crease was 29,4 per cent.
TABLE 3.3 
Acres nrCanc Plunieil, 1911-1940118)
Years /lews % increase
1911-15 107091
1916-20 15*1917 44,7
1921-25 208 522 34,6
1926-30 270 312 29,6
1931-35 325024 20,2
1935 •40 383 879 18,1
The indusiry bclwcon 191 > u. ‘ I -."2 *■», dcpcinlcm upon one variety of canc, namely Uba. 
i : i hnd l>ctn Inirodi. c 1 .n ■ t ■ - • ’ •in. drou^hi and disease resistance. The cane was
I  :r very liari' i . 1 i iv. v.Kn.ti uiud. « i.iorc difficull, expensive and slower to mill.
■ ,; silion v., mihur i nuvnched i>y Icgislnion which prevented other varieti-is from 
t>:ii;f ,1.1 - lvn..xi Jan wry 11127 and De xmt-er 1930, in an attempt :o eradicate Mosaic dis- 
iase»li • 'lie c’ine'igrowlh and conseqiittrnly led to diminished yieldi. (19) This ut- 
tc npt i! : i . . ,i wji oljnniioncd in 193U when il was discovered that the disease was
erUcmic in in.:,?; and "I'd grasses and would never bu eradicated. |20) In 1925 the Mount 
Cxpf.rinicn1 Station had been established lo .umluct research for the sugar indus- 
ir-.T!iis n'sea cS resulted in the introduction in the 193% of lour new varieties of canc, nnmc- 
I; Ci 2S). Co ?%' Co 301 and POJ. These canes had tlu advantage of being softer and there, 
'ore easier to mill, Zurthermore they give yield: with a greater sucrose content. Their 
inl>o-!ucllon meant that Uba's predominant «a» reduced in icven years to 23 per eeni of the 
canc harvested.
TABLE 3.4
Varielivs Fri'i'untngu of Cane Hurvested, 19J4-IMI [2i|
The cane yield increased by 42,8 per cent from 19 Ions per ncre in 1932 lo 27 ions per acre in 
1940. There was a 37,3 per cenl increase bclwecn 1937 and 1939 which coincided with the in­
crease in the proportion of Co 281 and Co 290 being tinnNislcd. Thus increases in yield can be 
ascribed to the introduction of new varieties as there wc.-e no major changos in the manage­
ment of estates in the period. |22|
1936 21,27 53
In the inter-war years sugar production was affected by three major disputes within the Indus­
try which led the industry to request Government intervention. The first arose from the per­
ception amongst growers that millers were making disproportionate profits in the boom fol­
lowing the ccssotton of hostilities in 1918, and the distribution of these profits. This led to the 
appointment of the Sugai Inquiry Commission under the chairmanship of W.D. Baxter which 
presented its report in 1922. |24| The commission found that the growers received 50 per cent 
of mill proceed;, rather than the 33,35 per cent which growers mistakenly believed they 
received. The Government implemented only two of the commissions recommendations; 
those concerning the abolition of the Mozambique concession in 1923 and the establishment of 
a sugar experimentation station in 1925.
The second dispute resulted in the Board of Trade & Industries Report on the industry In 
1926 |25], and was the consequence of dissalisfaclion with the importation of sugar into the 
Union, the organisation of the export market and the payment basis for wne. The intervention
Pngc ‘10
by Government led to llic Fahey Agreement of 1926 in which ihc basis of payment for cane 
whs changed from weight to sucrose content. The planters ngreed to participate in the export 
mnrket by sharing the costs involved and the miller would participate in ihc export murket on 
u pro-rnta basis in accordance with their output. The Governnienl granted the industry in­
creased protection nnd in return obtained the industry's consent to fix the retail price of sugar.
In the 1930s the world sugar market remained depressed und In terms of the Fahey Agree­
ment growers and millets shared the costs of exports. There were however a few millers who 
were not party to the 1926 Agreement nnd they had been able lo increase theii ,hare of ihc 
domestic market without having lo bear the costs of the export market. Furthermore, growers 
output after 1925 hjii risen by 50 per cent while miller-pianlers had increased their output by 
100 per cent. This placed an unfair burden upon the independent growers who had to share 
the costs of increased exports. These grievances led lo (ho ikird enquiry, (he Board of Trade 
and Industries Report of 1935. |2G| The findings were extensively discussed within the industry 
before being incorporated in the Sugar Act of 1936, The Act of 193ii provided for the self- 
government of the industry through the Sugar Industry Central Board that was to be 
responsible for the settlement of disputes, the administration of quota’s and ihc testing of 
cane. [27|
Production control was introduced with maximum quota’s for each mill which were then sub­
divided amongst the growers supplying each mill. |28] The grievance of the small growers was 
addressed as they were allowed lo excced their quoin by 3 500 tons at the expenw of the larger 
growers attached to their mill. |29] In Ihc 1936/37 season production was limited by the Gov­
ernment lo 476 888 tons and was incrensed by the supplementary agreement of September 
1938. [30] A new system of payment was also introduced, although still based on sucrose con­
tent, known ns the marginal formula, which gave growers a larger share of the proceeds. |31| 
The formula look inloactount both the cost of growing cane and of milling it with reasonable
efficiency. The production of new varieties of cane was nlso promoted through the introduc­
tion of premium prices for such cane. |32| Furthermore, all the mills had to share the 
domestic and export markets on a pro-rata basis. 133) The Government required the industry 
to introduce Grade I  sugar at a lower price in exchange for this restricted self-government.
in terms of the Fahey Agreement of 1926 and the Sugar Act of 1936, the costs of exports were 
shared between the millers and planters. Tit is, as noted previously, caused a great deal of 
resentment in the 1930s when the world market was depressed. The local price of sugar in the 
H years between the 1927/28 and the 1940/41 seasons declined by 19,7 per cent and the ex­
port price declined by 28,7 per cent. Those price reductions however did not curb output as 
the protected local market financed the losses sustained in the export market. Furthermore, 
compared to many other producers the local industry was'veil off.
TABLE 3.6
Prices Obtained for South African Sugar, 1927/28-1940/41 (34 j 
{X per ton)







Soulh African exports grew from 2 790 ions in 1910/11 to 308 763 Ions in 1939/40 and ab­
sorbed nn increasing proportion of production, The exportation of sugar can be divided into 
three periods, in the first one from 1910/11 to 1918/19 exports constituted less than 10 pur 
cent of total production. The 1918/W season is significant because it was the first time in the 
history of the industry that production exceeded consumption. In the second period from 
1919/20 to 1927/28 exports accounicd on average for 22,7 per cent of production. However, 
the average was reduced by tlio 3,4 per cent recorded in 1924/25 as a result of the drought. In 
the third period from 1928/29 to 1939/40 exports averaged 45,4 per cent of production.
Soulh Africa's major export market was Britain following the institution of an imperial prefer­
ence of 4s.3d. in 1919. The country's proportion of Empire sugar imports rose t'rom 2,4 per 
ccnl in 1919 to 3,5 per cent in 1925. (36) Britain continued to be the predominant market for 
South African sugar exports until World War Two. Exports to Britain rose from 51931 tons in 
1926/27 to 200 381 tons in 1938/39 and on average accounted for 75,8 per ccnl of total exports 
(Excludes 1937/3$ for whcfi figures arc no! araiZabfc). Canada also became an important ex­
port market and absorbed on average 28,6 per cent of total sugar exports between 1929/30 r ud 
1936/37. Canada played a crucial role in 1932/33 and 1933/34 when British imports declined, 
possibly as a result of I tic Ottawa Agreement which gave all Empire sugar producers equal ac­
cess to the British market, in the export market Soulh Africa was insulated from the world 
sugar crisis through ils preferential access to Britain and Canada-
Poge 44
TABLE 35
Sooth Mrleun Expm to To Urltoln & Camidu, 1926/27-1M8/39 ]37| 
(tons 20001b)
Britain %loial Canada % total
1928/29
1929/30
In terms of llic Inlcrn.ilionnl -rnt of 1937, South Africa undertook to export no
morn than 230 3SI) tons, , ,abject lo increjisc in accordance with the in-
crcnsc in British consumption. n the 1937/38 and 1938/39 seasons was divided
into a A and B pool, and in the 1939/40 season a C pool was added. The institution of quoins 
did not have a detrimental effccl upon the local industry as production quotas had been intro­
duced locally prior to the implementation of International restrictions. Furthermore, exports 
in the 1939/40 season increased by 84 979 tons as a result of representations by the Ministry of 
Food for Creal Britain. (39)
TABLE 3.9
South Africa's Qutiliis In Accordance With 1937 Agreement |40]
Se<M>. Total Expons A Pool B&C Pools
1937/38 258 047 229474 28571
1938/30 223 784 189 533 34 251
I939/4U 308 763 203 386 105 377
(c) linpiirta
Sugar imports dwlincd lo insignificance In ihc inlcr-wor pcrioil. This was as a result nf llic 
Baxter Conimisslon which led lo Ihc cancellation of the Mozambique concession and Ihe rais­
ing oflnrifTs which culmiwuied in 1932. Prior to ihc 1918/19 ssasnn intporls were iiuporlnn! 
and averaged 16,9 per ccnl of lota! locnl consumption, The two major source) of sugar im­
ports were Mozambique and Mauritius. This was acceptable as domestic production only sur­
passed local consumption for the lira time in 1918/19. Imports then declined to 0,8 per ccnl 
of total consumption In 1919/20 and rose to 2 per cent in 1920/21. This decline can be rs- 
critred lo strong world demand following the end of the First World War. Imports then surged 
In over 10 per cent of consumption in 1921/22 and 1922/23 in response to the surplus on the 
world market. In 1923/24 imports agitin declined to 0,3 per cent of consumption with the 
termination of the Mozambique preference.
Imports from Mozambique for the eleven years from 1910/11 to 1920/21 constituted on aver­
age 46,2 per cent of total sugar Imports. Mozambique achieved this through the 1909 Conven­
tion with the Transvaal which allowed Mozambique's sugar duty free access to the I otter's 
market. [4I| Furthermore, Mozambique sugar was cheaper than South African sugar because 
of its lower production costs. This preferential access to the Transvaal caused considerable 
resentment In the local industry |42|, but the agreement had been signed prior to union and 
was binding. Following the Baxter Commission report, the concession was removed in 1923 
when ihc new trade and labour convcnlion waj concluded with Mozambique. [43|
TABLE 3.10
Sugar Imports Fruin Mozambique, 1910/1M920/2I [44]





lit 1928/29 sugar Imporls ritou lo 11,3 per cent of domestic consumption as a result of low 
world prices; In particular the dumping of sugar by Czechoslovakia on the local market. |45| 
The large scale importation of sugar continued In the 1929/30, 1930/31 and 1931/32 seasons, 
with American sugar being dumped at 2 shillings less than the local wholesale price, |45| This 
led the industry lo ask fiovcrnmcnl for further tariff protection, which was granted. [47| In the 
seasons front 1932/33 lo 1939/40 sugar imports never exceeded 1 per cent of total local con­
sumption as a result of tariff protection,
The duty on imported sugar was raised progressively in order lo counter the threat to the 
domestic industry, The duly was increased on five occasions from 3:4x1, per 100 lb. in 1910 to 
las.Id. per 100 lb. in 1932, an increase of 359 per cent in 22 years. The protection given to the 
local industry dearly minimized imports and ensured lu growth and prosperity in ibeinier-war 
period. |4ft) However, the cost lo the domestic economy for protecting the sugar industry was 
estimated at £1,9 million in 1935 and nt 12,2 million in 1939. |49|
(d) Consumption
The per capita consumption of sugar in South Africa rose from 32 lbs. per annum in 1915 lo 47 
His, per annum in 1940, an increase of 45,9 per cent. Britain’s per capita consumption in con­
trast grew by only 15,8 per cc..! between 1900 and 1937, although front a higher base, [51! 
South African consumption only declined during the depression years, when it slumped lo 37
TABLE 3.11 
Duly On Imparted Sugar [50|
per 100/b.
ilbs. in 1935, a fall of 15,9 per cent. Consumplion between 1935 and 1940 increased by 27 per 
ccnl ns ii result of the improved economic conditions and the introduction of Grade 2 sugur.
r, 1915-194(1 [52| 
% increase
In August 1936 a new sugar known as Grade 2 wns Introduced to the market. |53] The idcn 
Originated within the Government and was accepted by (he industry as It offered them a op­
portunity to broaden their product basis, [M] Grade 2 sugar was sold at 2,Sd. per lb. and was 
positioned in the market to cater for the needs of the poorer section of the market, who could 
not afford 3,5d. per lb- for refined sugar. [55] In the 1938/39 season the 19,7 per cent increase 
in local consumption was attributed to the increasing demond for Grade 2 sugar. [56] The in­
dustry encouraged this trend by initiating an intensive advertising campaign amongst the Afri­
ca# population. (57j
The introduction of price control also influenced the consumption of sugar on the domestic 
market. Price control was first introduced on a voluntarily basis with the outbreak of World 
War One as a result of discussions between the Industry and Government, [581 The price was 
fixed in August id 14 at 17s, per 100 lbs. and wns raised the following month lo 20s, (59] In 
April 1917 the sugar price rose to between 04  and £39 a ton as a result of the industry drop­
ping their voluntarily price control, [GO] The Oiwernment, faced with escalating sugar prices, 
Introduced price control in May 1917, with the producer prk% fixed at 26s, per 100 lbs. There­
after, the price was fixed in accordance with market trends, first under the Moratorium Act 
and then under Act No, 13 of 1922, J61J Price control wns abolished in Juno 1923 when the act
expired, Deregulolion could thun be allowed bccuusc ihe world sugar prices had slumped and 
the domeiile price of sugar was no longer emaleilng.
irol of Sugar, 1917.1923 (62| 
(per 1001b.)
5/1917 26s.0d. 27s.9d. 6/1921) 4U.0d. 43s.0d.
6/1917 26s-0d. 27s,9d. 8/1920 Sls.Od. 53s.6d.
5/I91S Ms.Od. 27s,9d. 8/1921 31s.0d. 33s^d,
12/1918 21s,lOd, 23s.7d. 10/1921 29s,Od. 31sAd,
1/1919 233-Od, 24s.6d. 5/1922 25s-0d. 27s,6d.
6/1919 26M . 27s,%l, 4/1923 30sfld, 33s,0d.
11/1919 29s.3d. 31s,3d.
The market remained deregulated until 1926 when price control was again instituted In terms 
of the Sugar Prices Act. (C3| The domestic sugar market and industry by thii stage was again 
threatened by cheap Imports and in exchange for protection, consented to the Government 
fixing the price of sugar. The maximum retail price for refined sugar was fixed at 3,75d, per lb, 
and 3,5d. per lb. for mill white. |64] The retail price remained at this level until 1932 when 
prices were reduced to 3,3d. and 3,25d. respectively In terms of Act No,23. (65] Tills was the 
consequence of lower world prices and in exchange tor inaeased protection. The 1936 Sugar 
Act reiaincd these maximum prices and required that Grade 2 be sold at 2^d. f66J The price 
was only increased again in October 1946 [67], due to the low world sugar prices.
The manufacturing sectors consumption of sugar became an increasingly important com­
ponent of the sugar market, as its consumption increased by 316,1 per cent between the 
1916/17 and the 1939/40 seasons. The demand for sugar in this sccior originated in the Cape 
Province where the canning and spirits Industries were located, and was augmented by the 
confectionary trades requirements. In the 12 year period lictwccn 1916/17 and 1926/27 con­
sumption In this sector rose by 76,4 per cent. Consumption then declined as a result of the 
depression by 2 367 tons to 22 475 tons in 1931/32, In 1933 there was an upturn in demand for
■/v ,
i
sugar from Iho fruil cnnnerks of Ihc South WcMern Cnpc. |C 
•if sugar ihcn conllnued lo csMlaieunli! 1939/40 when Ihc sc
Manufacturing's consumption 
3r -ibsorbuil 44 522 tons.
(e) Millhil!
The milling sector of the industry was subjcct to continued consolidation between 1900 and 
1940, wih IJic cumbur of mills In operntion being reduced from 33 to 22. This crease wns 
the result of company mergers and the high capital cost of the machinery used in the scctor. 
The large capital (ixpcndituie is illustrated by the fact that the value of machinery and plant in 
the 1915/16 season in 31 factories was estimated at £1253 000 and increased to 12 144 000 in 
Ihc 1921/22 season despite the reduction in I lie number of mills to 28. [66] Therefore, the 
average investment per mill rose from 140419 in the 1915/16 season to £76 57Un the 1921/22
The objective In milling was to extract the greatest possible amount of sucrose from the cane 
and the mills operated between May and December when the sucrose content was at its op­
timum. |71| The efficiency of mills in this reg .td is measured by means of the sucrose extrac­
tion, boiling house recovery and overall recovery rates. The comparison of the rates for the 10 
year periods between 1925-1934 and 1935-1944 show that Ihc average mill performance did 
improve by 6,2 per cent in terms of the overall recovery rale. This can be ascribed in part to 
the investment in plant and the research conducted into bclcr extraction methods.
SUGAR MILLS IN
■ ENTUMENI SUGAR
• RENISHAW FACTORY, CROOKES
SCALE 1' 2 000 000
TABLE 3,15 




However, the cfficicncy of the mills was limllcd by the compositici of lh» cane and the conc to 
sugar ratio. There was only a slight improvement between 1925-1934 and W3S-1944, whi.-h 
limited the overall improvement of mill efficiency. The improvement that did occur can be as­
cribed to the utilization of new varieties of cane In the 1930s which contained more sucrose 
and less fibre. The Impact of more efficient milling on the industry as a whole was to improve 
its profitability.
The sugar mills produced three by-products from the crushed cane, namely bagasse, filter- 
press cake and molasses. [74] Bagasse was made up of fibre and was used to fuel thu mil! 
boilers. The fuel value of bagasse was 15 per cent of the fuel value of coal and a ton of cane 
produced 0,33 Ions of bagasse which was the equivalent of 100 lbs, of coal, (75) Bagasse 
enabled the mills to reduce their runiiinu costs and utilize a by-product in the process. The 
residue left in the filter-press after the sap passed through it was known as filter-prcM cake 
and was used as a fertilizer on the cane fields. [76] Molasses was sold to Ihe manufac: ring 
sector either locally or overseas, who used it to produce alcohol and alcohol related
TABLE 3.16 
Composition of Cane (73]
Siicroic Fibre Cane To 
% Cane % Cane Sugar Ratio
(I) Labour
Labour was an important componcm within the sugar industry between 1910 and 19-10, as il 
accoumcil for 50 per cent of the recurring expenditure wiiliin the industry. |78) In 1937 the 
cost of wages and rations was estimated to amount to two million pounds annually. |79| Fur­
thermore, employment within the industry increased by 8,5 times between 1905 and 1945; from 
S 000 workers in 1905 to 40 SS9 In 1929 and reached 6S 000 in I!MS, [SOI
The major change wilhin the labour field was the decline in the importance of Indian labour 
and the rise of African labour. Indians employed in the cane fields decreased from 56 per cent 
of the total labour force in 1914/15 to only 7 per cent in 1944/45. In the milling sector the 
number of Indians employed declined by 28 per cent, from 4028 in 1925 to 3 190 in 1934. [Slj 
Africans employed in the cane fields increased from 44 per cent of the total labour force in 
1914/15 to 93 per cent in 1944/45. In the milling sector the number of Africans employed in­
creased from 4 189 in 1925 to 4 823 in 1934. |82j
Season Mioiis African
1907/08
African employment within Ihe eyictillural sector of the industry was a complex process with 
different recruitment areas for Natal and Zululanti, African labour was employed as either 
casual labour on a monthly basis and recruited locally or as migrant labour recruited on a 180 
shift contract from outside the province. There was a tendency to use the casual labour for
planting and cullivalhit, and the inigrunis For atac anting although the converse could also 
apply. The industry was dcpcndciil throughoul the period upon migrant labour tor al least 40 
per cent of its requirements. |84| This dependence on migrant labour was the result of wlial 
the Farm Lnlxiur Coin.niltee described as poor housing, feeding and the lack of medical atten­
tion. [85] The larger estates provided brick housing but on the smaller estates workers often 
had to erect their own accommodation. The rations provided to the African labour force con­
sisted on average of: 90 lbs. of maize meal, 8 lbs. of beans, 2 lbs. of sugar, 4 lbs. of meat and 4 
lbs. of sail per month, which they had to prepare themselves. f86j
Seinarl maintains that Africans viewed the work on sugar estates as hard and the wages as 
low, which made the mines n better prospect. |87] In 1913 the wages paid to Africans on the 
gold mines were 73,3 per cent higher than those of sugar and the Natal coal mines paid 46,3 
per cent more. Furthermore, the wage figures for gold and cool are based upon 26 shifts and 
those for sugar upon 30 shifts. In 1937 the position had become even worse with the two sec­
tors paying 94,7 per cent and 603 per cent more than sugar. Wages In the sugar industry for 
the period 1913 to 1937 increased by 23 per cent, but from a very low base. Clearly the sugar 
industry did not offer the same financial rewards as the other industries. In addition, the 
mtges paid in Natal were higher than the wage.; in Zulubnd. Actual wage figures arc only 
available for Zululnnd in 1939 when the difference amounted to 10 shillings or 25 per cent. 
The farmers maintained thal this was due to the smaller size of production units in Zululnnd 
unit the higher transportation costs which reduced margins, and therefore wages. [88] These 
factors may have contributed to this trend but the major reason was the presence of migrants 
from Mozambique, who were prepared to work for lower wages. The farmer oftta com­
plained about the quality of the migrant laliour, which they employed, and maintained that 
they obtained those migrants rejected by the mines. [89] In view of the way the industry was 
perceived by Africans and the lower wages paid, it is quite possible that the farmers' assertion 
was correct.
TABLE 3.18




The |iuymqnl Foe a shift in ihc ease of canc cullcrs depended upon ihe completion of the 
'siandunT which was 14 tons of canc cut, trashed and loaded. In the cue of burnt cane the 
standard was increased to 2 tons as there was no trashing. Furthermore, the canc cutters were 
paid a bonus of Id. for every 100 lbs. above the standard. |9l]
The Natal sugar industry obtained its African migrant labour from Pondoland. The industry 
was able to attract this labour prior to 1921 because of the system of advances, whereby the 
migrant could obtain eattlc and/or cash in advance of commencing work, (92J The advance 
system was curtailed with the introduction of the Native Advance Regulation Act of 1921. 
This was the result of representations by the Chamber of Mines whose recruitment had been 
detrimentally affwtcd and I ecause of widespread abuse of the system. Mpondo labour was 
also attracted to the sugar industry became the work was above ground and the contract was 
relatively short • involving 180 shifts. |93| The industry’s position was further strengthened by 
Ihc malaria epidemic of 1929 to 1932, as Mpondo labourers were not allowed north of the 
Tugclu for fear of their being infecMd. (9-t) Mpondo labour remained vital to the industry in 
Natal and constituted between 10 and fiO per cent of the labour force in 1939. |95J
In 1912 11, was already rccogniscd that the sugar industry in Zululand would require labour 
from Mozambique. |96) This was because Zululand required malaria tolerant labour which
sognlscd [hut labour fron
vindicnlcd hy I lie malutio epidemic between
. of those employed in Soulh Africa in 1930- [100|
ZulutofKi sugar imluslrywas ailowd from lie end of 1$35.,
rcg'mn bul ihcrc wassiill an cslimaied labour shortage of between 2(1 and 25 per cent. [102|
Ike years between 1910 and 1939 Ihc only major induslria
workers. |1IM| The strike by the Indian sugar workers 1
; campaign. (1051 "Hie slrilcc was in protest against the £3 Uix payable by Indians
ndlnns. |106| The strike delayed the completion of the cutting anti crushing of the seasons 
one crop and led to the illegal burning of 150 acres of cane, The strikers relumed to work In 
iccember anti Smuts then Appointed a Commission of Enquiry, The Commissions finding!
aboKshed (f(/7| The sink
' i
Moznmblquc possessed. In 1925 the Gwcrnmcnl protibilcU the rccruitmcnl of Mczniiibitjiic 
Inhour cxecpl for Ihc mines on ihe Rand. |97] This led to an outcry by Ihc industry which 
rccognisctl llint labour from Pondoliintl and Basutoland would readily succumb to 
intilnrln. |98| The industry's view was vindicated by the malaria epidemic between 1929 nail 
1932 which led to a decline in Transkei labour and n ban by Basutoland on recruitment for 
Zululand. [991 Zuluiand furmcrs had continued to make use of Illegal Mozambique labour 
after 1925 and this accounted for 50 per cent of those employed in South Africa in 1930. (100) 
The revised Mozambique Treaty of 1934 made no provision for recruitment by the sugar in­
dustry, but following representations by the industry ’a the government, recruitment of 
Mozambique labour for the Zululand sugar Industry wa; nilowed from the end of 1935. |101j 
In 1939 Mozambique labour accounted for 40 per cent of tin industry’s requirements in the 
region but there was still an estimated labour shortage of between 20 and 25 per cent, [102] 
Furthermore, Zululand accounted for 34 per cent of the land under cane but used 41 per cenl 
of the labour. |I03| This was ascribed to management problems associated with small produc-
In the years between 1910 and 1939 the only major industrial action within the sugar Industry 
occurred in 1923. The 1913 Jmiun slril'c look ptocc between October and November, and in­
volved 15 000 sugar workers. [t04J The strike by the Indian sugar workers was a spontaneous 
action, that was influenced to some extent by the Newcastle miners strike and Gandhi passive 
resistance campaign. |i05] The strike was in protest against the D  tax payable by Indians who 
had come into Natal under the Indenture Act of 1895. In 1913 the lax affected about 10 800 
Indians. |106| The strike delayed the completion of the cutting and crushing of the seasons 
canc crop and led to the Illegal burning of ISO acres of cane. The strikers returned to work in 
December and Smuts then appointed a Commission of Enquiry. The Commissions findings 
were incorporated in the Indian Relief Act of 1914, in terms of which the £3 lax was 
abolished. 1107] The strike was not the result of conditions within the sugar Industry; but the
abulilion of !hc tux mcnm Ilia! Ihe Indians were no longer so dependent upon the sugar indus­
try, 11081
Conclusion
The South African sugar industry became a net exporter between 1910 and 1939, and was not 
effected by the crisis in the International sugar trade to the same extent as many other pro­
ducers. The industry could not have flourished to the extent it did, had it not been for Govern­
ment protection and assistance that provided it with a captive home market. This captive 
home market allowed the industry to finance its export market, which was aided by Ihe prefer­
ential access the industry enjoyed in Britain and Canada. Internally the industry was charac­
terized by an uneasy relationship between growers and millers who were forced to co-operate 
through their mutual need, The Government intervened whenever this relationship became 
unbearable, and in exchange obtained sugar at a fixed price and, in the 1930s, the introduction 
of Grade 2 sugar. However when labour matters were involved, the Government always 
placed the needs of gold mining before those of sugar. By 1939, the industry had established 
itself on a sound economic fooling through the protection it enjoyed domestically. The focus 
of the subsequent chapters is the operation of C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd., a sugar business, within 
this environment,
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CHAPTER 4
C.G.Sm ith & Company Limited, 1910-1939
liilriKliiciliin
In 1888 Chiirlcs (Icorgc Smilh went inlo husincss for himself ond began buying and distribut­
ing Ixith sugar ,ind ealile along the Nntnl consl, Smith's business prospered and this led to the 
fnrmallnn of CG.Smltb A Company Limited in 1911). He did not have much capital lo begin 
with, so he could not go into either forming or manufacturing. Hence he moved Into working 
as a commission agent where the growers trad bonks provided him with his capital. Smith’s 
core business throughout the period 1910 to 1939 was the selling of sugar on a commission
Charles Cicorge Smith was born In London, on the 27th December 1858. In 1861 Charles 
came oul to Natal with his parents. The family did not prosper and he relumed in 1868 lo 
England with his mother. In 1873 Smith returned lo Natal and found employment with Black 
and Baxter, who were general merchants in Durban, The firm engaged hint to buy and sell 
livestock on their sugar estate at Umzimo. Smith whilst at Umzinlo became acquainted with 
sugar planting and with the Reynolds and Crookes families, Charles then went to work for 
W.B.Lylc and concentrated upon the sugar and hides and skins side of the business. He was 
subsequently appointed as the manager of Lyles sugar estate, the Kirby Vale Estate. It was 
while resident on this estate that he became lifelong friends with Frank Reynolds; a friendship 
that was to Ire very important to his Inter business activities.
In 1876 Charles went lo work for Frank Bcningficld, on auctioneer, in Durban, Smith was al­
ready a sharp businessman and, in 1879, at the age of 21 years, was given a partnership In the 
business. Charles remained with Bcningficld until 1888, when ho and J.Holslon went into 
1 'tlness for themselves trading as Holslnn & Smith. The focus of the business was general
auctioneering logcilicr wiili (lie buying und dislriiiullon of bnlli sugar nnd cattle along Iho Na- 
ifil roast. By IS')4 Smidiwiis trading on I. sown under (ho nnme or.Smitlifield.
In l'n!2 I lie need fur additional c ipiltil as a result of tlic yrowtli of the business led C.GSmith 
U> a limit two partners, namely J.P.Dcnhtim imd J.W.Zecman [I] Oy 1909 Zeeman had left the 
business and the partnership consisted of Smith und Denham. [2] The partnership limited the 
financial resources of the firm and also meant that Smith and Denham were responsible for all 
debts. The Standard Bank said of Smith:
Appears a forceful imlMihial, able am! eiuerprismg but perhaps not \viy emulous. |3]
Smith wns ambitious and realized that ia order to progress they would have to form a limited 
liability company, which they did in 1910 lo take advantage of Union. The core of this business 
was sugar wholesaling. Smith's business prospered because of the support of (he Reynolds 
and Crookes w hom he influenced liecause of their respect for his ability to market their sugar 
output. As Oslxirn notes:
The tusociatim o f Hicsc two grew South Coast fo/uWsj, the Reynolds and the 
Crookes, with CG.Smith, m s probably as Ideal, from a business point of view, as It 
Kimltl be possible to find in an enterprise mch as sugar, ]4)
This personal friendship which Smith built up with these families meant that they remained 
loyal to him rather than shifting their allegiance. Furthermore, Hulctts were the only other 
distributor and dominated the industry on the north coast and in Zululand. The support of the 
Reynolds and Crookes seems to have been reinforced and stiengtliened by (heir (heir 
animosity towards Hulclts, (he rival distributor of sugar in Natal.
Smith’s experience and knowledge of sugar distribution and wholesaling was such, that for­
ward Integration into distribution and wholesaling on their own behalf whca they periodically 
fell out with him, was not seriously considered. It would also have involved the outlay of large 
amounts of capital ou(side (heir field of operations, namely sugar planting and production,
A ilclailoil analysis of I he (ipcmiions of C.CI.Smilli & Co. Lid. in Ihc period 910 lo 1930 I* ex­
tremely (iirficult Ixieause of Ihc hick of rccords of I he core business, sugar distribution. The 
problem is cxnccrlialec! hy the hick of copies of the ;miiuiil report’ Tor ihc period prior to 1940. 
As nn entrepreneur will limited capilal resources, he wus uhv-.iys righting for surviviil and had 
liltlc lime to mnke copious notes nbotit his melliods or motives. In order lo obtain an insight 
inlo the ope ml ions nnd methods of C.G .Smith il is necessary lo examine the ventures outside 
Ihc rare business, sugar dislribulion, which the company embarked upon. Some records huvc 
survived dealing wilh the rclnlionship wilh the Standard Bank, and there are a few records of 
ihc marginal enterprises of Imperial Buildings Limited and Nalul Cane By-Products, and the 
failed ventures of African Oil Mills, South African Condensed Milk Company Limited, Alias 
Petroleum Products (Ply.) 1 td. nnd Vegetable Fibre Products of South Africa Ltd. Records 
dealing with the establishment of the pension Fund, one of ihe earliest in South Africa, provide 
an insight inlo the progressive side of C.Gimllh.
Smith retained control throughout the period; his knowledge appears to have been vital to the 
success of ihe business. Smith remained nn example of what Chandler would refer to as entre- 
prcneuriaf capitalism, In ilicsc circumstances (ha company reHceled his strengths 2nd 
weaknesses.
An Overview: 1910-1M9
In Octobcr 1910 C.G.Smith & Co. Lid. was establUhed to acquire Smith’s and Denham's busi­
ness interests in livestock and sugar trading, and shipping. [5] The firm had a share capital of 
£28 000 divided amongst ihe founding directors, namely C.G.SmUh, F.Reynolds and 
J.D.Denham, |8| In 1013 Ihe Board was expanded to include C.G.Crookes and S.F,Crookes; 
H.Brunskili joined in 1914; J.W,Zeeman in 1915 and Wm.Pearce in 1916. [7| This meant lhal 
all the major sugar Inleresls on the Natal soulh const were represented on ihe Board; 
Reynolds Brothers, Crookes Brothers and Mlnvo Sugar Estates * in the person of Wm.Pearce.
By 1017 the Company had apparently progressed lo such an extent that il was decided to 
reconstruct the firm, in order lo provide it with a larger capital base. (8| The capilal was in-
crenscd by £28 000 lo 136 000, Ihc 28 000 new shores were iircfcrcnee shares bearing a (Jivi- 
deml of 7,5 |icr ccnl |«r annum, subject io Ihc Pirm milking ii profil. [9| Reynolds Brothers 
suhscrihcd for 151100 shares, lllovo Sugar Estates for 8 000 shares and Crookes Brothers for 
the remaining 5 000 shin es. 110| The Board also created 28 founders shares which would 
receive 25 per cent uf the proFits annually. [11] Oncc ogoin Reynolds Brothers were allocated 
15 foimilers si- res, lllovo were given S shares and Crookes Brothers the rum lining 5 
shares. 112) Tins highlights C.O,Smith's business acumen us through this share allocation 
C.G,Smith & Co. Ltd. were assured of the agency for their sugar distribution. Furthermore, 
Smith's probably required the extra capital because of their involvement in Chuku’s Kraal 
which had been formed in 1916 and is discussed in Chapter 6,
In 1917 C.fi.Smlth & Co. Lid. were appointed the sole agents for a period of 10 years, for the 
sale of all sugar and other products of Reynolds Brothers, Crookes Brothers, lllovo Estates 
and Umvimkulu Estates. [13] In terms of the agreement the firm received a 3,5 per cent com­
mission on all business it undertook on behalf of these concerns and they in turn received a 
rebate of 1,5 per cent on the firm's profits. (14] It was hoped that the rebate would increase 
Ihc volume of sugar business done through Smith's, [ 15] The Company was now in a much 
stronger position following the injeaion of additionai money inlo ihc buiincjs 2nd having 
sccurcd the agency agreement, C.G-Smith as a result was filled with confidence and began to 
think in terms of a dynasty. Smith staled Hint:
He was sun this was the nucleus o/ o vc/y big co-opernth'c concern, not only for their
own time, but for those who came after them. [16|
Smith had his mind set on creating a large company and therefore in 1919 callcd for an in­
crease in the firms share capital. ] 17] C.O,Smith was also motivated by two additional reasons. 
First, Ihc company had acquired Umzimkulu Estates, the subject of Chapter 5, and needed ad­
ditional working capital. Secondly, he recognised that if the young and talented members of 
Ihc firm such as Dickens and Brunskill were lo be retained, then they had to be given the op­
portunity of acquiring shares In the business, |19| The proposal put forward by Smith entailed
increasing Mic shnrc cn|)ii(il sq £1-15 1)110 through convening llie founders and preference 
shares. |20| However according to legal opinion llie rights allocated to these shares had been 
so well entrenched as to make such a conversion impossible. |2l) Therefore in May 1920 the 
capital of the firm was increased to £131 000 through the creation of 75 000 ordinary 
shares. |21| This shows the extent to which C.G.Smilh was able to impose his ideas for expan­
sion on his fellow directors and his ability to control the financial direction of the firm on n vir­
tually unopposed basis. He was also a very astute businessman In giving the younger members 
of staff a stake in the company,
However C.G.Smilh did nut override the Board on all issues and in particular, he encountered 
objections to certain acquisitions made by the firm. Smith’s bought Umzimkulu Estates in 
1920. the subject of Chapter 5, and this led to numerous objections by the Board. [23] This op­
position forced C.G.Smilh to sell the business in 1921 to n private consortium which ho 
headed.|24|
During the 1920 financial year the firm had embarked upon an advertising campaign. (25] The 
promotion had been a general one and not directed at any particular segment of the market 
which tailed llie ire of C.O.Smkk. |2fij He fell llml unless such s  campaign was directed at the 
consumer to increase the overall demand In the market, then It was a waste of money. [27] 
Smith’s reaction suggests that he was a difficult associate but one who when so inclined, could 
pinpoint wastage.
C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. in accordance with C.O,Smith’s desire to expand, had diversified into 
sugar production and had also become involved in speculative ventures such as African Oil 
Mills. By 1922 as a result of these activities the firm had accumulated liabilities exceeding 
£500 000 [28] and this free-spending attitude culminated in the Company recording a loss of 
£33 000 in 1923. |29] Furthermore, the firm had lost £127 000 of its capital which meant that if 
it was to survive, it would require the injection of more money. [30] The desperate position of 
C.G.Smilh & Co, Ltd. led to the directors blaming one another for the firm's situation, al­
though it seems that they were all responsible, as In 1922 not a single Board meeting had been
held. |.T11 The Dlreclorj. in nrdur lo overcome I lie financial dilemma faced hy Hie roni|my, 
decided lo soil lo n new firm thul iliey would snlncquemly csiahlisli. |.!2|
The finnncial records for the period 1911) 10 1917 are not available and It is therefore im­
possible lo nccnralely gmige llie company's performance during ihosc years. However ihc firm 
Iwc.ime increasingly profiiable belwcen 1918 and 1921, with profits rising from £13 S97 lo 
£22 ?8S. H appears to Itave been C.fi.SmlllVs overly umbilicus expansion and specululion ihat 
led to the loss of £33 Ol«l in 1913.
TABLE 4.1
Pro Ills ol C.r.,Snil!h & Cm Lid., 1918-1923 (33]
1918 13 897
1919 15 104
1920 2 1 259
V'73 -33 000
Hole: ’ figure not available,
The financial crisis caused by the £33 OH) loss in 1923, led lo I he formal ion of a now company 
and Ihc injctlion of new capital into Ihc company. In April 1923 a new company also called 
C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. was formed, with a capital of £187 COO, of which 1138 000 was paid 
up. |34} The share Issue consisted of 5rt 000 ordinary shares, 23 000 ‘A’ preference shares alio-
caled pro rala lo holders of preference sii.h.s In the old company and 103 000 'B1 preference
shares allocated lo holders of ordinary shares in Ihc old company. [35) Reynolds Brothers 
were ihc largest shareholders with 74 126 shares; C.G.Smilh held 53 000 shares; Illovo Sugar 
Fislulcs held 31 796 shares am Crookes Brothers held 19078 shares. [36| This reorganisation 
meant that the total amount of new money brought into the business was only £7 000, lo be 
used as working capital. Furthermore the sugar agency agreement was renegotiated on the 
basis of a 2,5 per ccnl commission to Smith's plus a further 0,5 per cent for the 
wholesalers. |37) This commission for the wholesalers was to ensure llini the firm was compe­
titive throughout the Union. |3S|
SSSSSety-i a «--t-
iillfHculdcs I lint ilic Cimipony fuccd, (innicularly os domusllc ddiiond conlniclcd. [-16] The ini­
tial finnncinl crisis of llic firm win the rcsuil of ilio ilifficult Iruding conditions of llie laic 192115 
,in<l early I'J.Wh. The sulisciiuent financial prnblcm was the rcsuil of llie vxpimslon of llic 
Miliar industry and llie increase In s-tles, wliicli required more working cnpiliil lo be injected 
inlotlic hnsincss,
rite difTicnll hnsincss conditions led llie mmpttnylo slrenglhen Us financial position by ini- 
plemcntlng four clmngiu in its nperationa. First, tlic new agency agreement uf 1933 eliminated 
the 0,5 per cent commission paid to wholesalers but retained liic firms commission n( 2,5 per 
ccnt. |-I7] Secondly, the terms for sugar sales were changed from 30 days to a cash basis which 
improved Its financial position. |4X| Thirdly, in 1934 the company called up 5 shillings per or­
dinary share and a further 2s.6d. per slmre In 1936, Increasing the capital by £21000, from 
£138 1100 to £159 tKW. |49| Fourthly, this financial pressure and the expanding nature of 
Smith’s shipping Interests led to the creation of a separate firm - Smith’s Coasters in 1927, the 
subject of Chapter 7. Hie company's planting interests and other speculative ventures con­
tinued to be a drain on its resources and CG.Smith admitted that:
77ic npennion of llic Camflaiy been extended fur bqyonil their legiiintale business of
telling sugar. (5fl|
The firm encountered further difikultles In the 1936/37 season as a result of the introduction 
of quotas for the industry. However the firm and CO.Smith, in particular, refrained from gel­
ling Involved In any more speculative ventures and concentrated upon sugar distribution. As 
Smith noted:
ll’c /tin* no difficulty In /liticing imr finger on llie best part of litis business, which of
come is sugar |5I|
This resolve to remain dear of new risks continued to hold sway until 1940. In 1939 Smith 
staled thut:
During the year a gtxx/ many pmpositltm.: uw  turned dam owing to the feeling of 
tmvrudmym the pih idcttl simthm mid it wits this uncertainty which compelled its to 
Iwdtale Infm  spanting money on nyii' itiiliw.t presented to its. |52|
TABLE 4.2
(.•.C.Snillli & Co- Lid. I'niHI & Kdtini on Slmre Oipllnl, 19J4.194I) |53| 
(Finandiil ycarcnilcil 31 March)
Year Share Capital Profit Return on
(Q (£) JVwre C fW
l'!24 138 000 24 412 0,18
1')25 138 000 13 8S7 0,10
m > 138 000 9 507 0,07
l'«7 138 000 17 (MS 0,12
IVIS 1381X10 33 136 0,24
IW! 1381100 36 484 0,26
1930 138 0(10 23 825 0,17
IV31 138 000 35535 0,26
I'm  135 OX) 34 530 0,25
103.3 138 000 (15 000 0,47
1034 138 000 40 4SI 0,29
1035 152 000 53 138 0,38
1036 159 000 85 382 0,54
1037 159 000 46 567 0,29
1038 159 000 64 225 0,40
1039 159 001 64 221 0,40
1940 l«fQ00 68-"U 0,43
The profits for each financial year arc available In the 16 years from 1924 In 1940, the firm 
rocorilcd conllnuous profiis. However the Inlernalionol commodi(y market was chnrnctcrlzed 
hy slow growth In the 1920s and slagnutlori in Ihc 1930s. Sugar inlcrnalionally experienced a 
price decline from 1920 to 1937. SoUh Africnn sugar production for the years 1924 to 1940 al­
most trebled and Sniilh distributed approximately 35 per cent of Ihc total production. Sales ol' 
sugar also Increased but prices were low and profits did not rise to the same extent. Smith re 
curded continuous profits In these years because he could not lose, lie was being paid on turn­
over and when ihings became difficult there was the agreement among the sugar producers 
and finally government intervention. If the planters made a loss, he could make u profit. 
Others could have done this, hut only Smith saw I he market opportunity and moved in to do it. 
lie provided a service that did not require a large amount of fixed capital and which, if. uc- 
ccwfjl, made the producers dependent on him.
l\irlng the year a wwt i- w  mmvd ilown owing to the feeling of
imcertttlnrvm Ihi'imlilinl multi mw iht uncertainly which amipelleitii.no
Ih-ilhih1 hcf'rc spciulhtx inomy on new vcuuks imaemctl to m . [52)
TAHLEJ.2
:li & Ch. Ltd. I’l'iilll iS Itutiini nn Him it Cupltul, l!>2J-l!U0 [53] 
(Finnnckil yenr ended 31 Murdi)
IM4 IMOOO 24 412 0.18
I'tM 138 000 13 887 0,10
I'J’h 138 000 9 507 0,07
M:7 138 000 17 003 0,12
1*3 1381)110 33 136 0,24
vm  138 0(10 3(i 484 0,26
l').» 138 0110 23 825 0,17
I'm  138 000 35 535 0,26
i‘!32 138 000 34 530 0,25
TO.! 138 000 65 000 0,47
HN 138 000 40481 0,29
l'J35 152 000 58 138 0,38
1936 159 000 85 382 0,54
1937 159 000 46 567 0,29
1938 159 000 64 225 0,40
1939 159 000 64 221 0,40
1940 159 000 68 261 0,43
The profits for c.iclt financial year arc nvallnblc. In (he 16 years from 1924 (o 1940, the firm
reciirdcd continuous profits. However (he InlcrnMtonni commodity murkel was churncterlzeil 
hy slow growth in the 1920s nml slngnaiion in the 1930s. Sugar intenmiioniilly exiwricnced a 
price decline from 1920 (o 1937. South African sugar produc(ion for (he years 1924 to 1940 nl- 
m(to( (rcbled and Snii(h distributed approximately 35 per cent of the total production. Sales of 
suyiir also increased but prices were low and profits did not rise to the same extent. Smith re­
corded continuous profits In these years because lie could not lose, lie was being paid on turn­
over and when things became difficult there was the agreement among the sugar producers 
and finally government intervention, If the planters made n loss, he could make u profit, 
Others could hive done this, but only Smith saw the market opportunity and moved In to do it. 
He provided a service that did not retjulre it large amount of fixed capital and which, if sue- 
cevful, made the producers dependent on him,
If C'.G.Smith lnul 1101 tiiga[ii;il In the speculative veiilures ilistussetl lulcr in the dmplcr, then 
the financial results woultl prtilxiWy have liecn heller. Furthermore the firms returns front its 
plan'ins ventures discussed in chapters 5 and 6, and Its shipping interests den It with in chapter 
"’ were not very profitahle in the period. Clearly front the information available, the firm was 
saved by its liivtihemcnt in sugar distribution which accounted for I lie major share of the prof­
its recorded between 192*1 and l.'MI).
Aspects Ilf the business
This section examines llte firms business ventures outside of the core business, sugar distribu­
tion, In an nllcnipt to gain more insight into the operations and methods of C.ti.Smilh.
(Ill The Hcintlnnslilp tilth Slandurd llnuk
Smith provided the Standard Bank with its largest source of income in Nulnl, and the Bank In 
turn provided Smith with much of his working capital. Their relationship in the inter-war peri­
od can be characterized as one of mutual Interest and one which was profitable to both con­
cerns. However (be Bank records only refer to CC.Smhli & Co. Ltd when it bttdstibsiftntial 
debts owing to the Bank and therefore provides an imperfect picture of their relationship.
The Standard Bank viewed C.Q.Smilh as a wild entrepreneur wlto often overrode his Direc­
tors to the detriment of the firm. In effect C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd, were seen as an extension of 
C/I,Smith's own person. The General Manager sold:
Since Iti inception the Cvinpmy’s ftnuncial policy had been pmctlcally solely control- 
leil hy Sir Chas.C.Smlth, a hold and fearless operator, wZio, in liglit of after events, 
has hn-ohvd himself and Ms co-Dlrectors in exceedingly heaty liabilities as a restdt of 
his speculative policy, |5-l]
In spite of this assessment the Bank co-operated with Smith’s because of the perceived in- 
finencc of the firm and its ability to direct business to the Bank. The Bank Report stalest
Tin' Ciimpimy's wiiVjiiv coiuiivtltm Kith tin uiyur imhuiiy In Natal ami the valuable 
comma under vrhkh it c""  the sale of the Khotaontpnt nf various sugar estates
for ten years from I02Z It, ■ :ble lo cnntlmtc to su/ipon the Company mil the
fieillties nfemd to hereunder. |\'i|
l:urlhcrmore, llic nccount opcr.Ucd hy CXi.Smith & Co. Lid. at ihc Durban Branch was ilic 
largest and must profitable account at the Branch. |5fi| The Company's account had an aver­
age turnover between ll)22 and 1931 of C2 LM 549 per annum, which provided the Bank with 
considerable income through service charges. The size of Smith's account, together with the 
influence of the firm in the sugar industry, appears lo have motivated the Bank's decision to 
provide CXi.Smith & Co. Ltd. with large overdraft facilities. The financial resources which, as 
a result, became available la the Company allowed it to recover from mistakes that would 
otherwise have forced It into liquidation. The records of the firms banking business for the 
1930s arc not mailable, This is unfortunate because sugar production doubled between 1932 
and 1940, and one would expect the accounts turnover to have increased considerably. This 
section consequently provides evidence of the mutually beneficial relationship between the 
gifted entrepreneur and his bankers, Table 4,3 provides the details.
TABLE 4.3
C.Ci-Smith & Co. Ltd. Account Turnover & Overdraft Facilities 
at Standard liniik, 1922.1931 J57J
Year Turnover Overdraft
1922 2 006 999 174 699
1923 1 664 804 168 4SS
1925 1 656 251 141 530
Ida 2 033 661 225000
1929 2 500 000 225 000
1930 2 816435 225000
19.11 2 333 698 225000
(111 Marginal Enterprises
Smith's did not Incur 'osscs front their Investment in Imperial Buildings Ltd. and Natal Cane 
By-Products Ltd, but could probably have employed the resources belter elsewhere,
Imjicrliil lidllilluns l.liuiltil
In I'll,? C.(i..Smil|t & Cn. Ltd. pui •'mscd 126:7 slvirci, oul of a mini of .33 DM slvires, In Inv 
ivri.d Uuildinus I .id. :ii 2.i.f)et. |>ur iliyrv. |5SJ This whs uppnrcnlly dunu in order lo ncijulrc 
new iilfia' amiimiiinliiMoii for the CoDipnny. |5V] inipcrlid OuiUlngs was it soimd Invosltnctii 
.ind i'V ihs I'lih  was rewiring annual rentals amoimlinjj lo £0 01)0. [f>0] In IS>25 CO Sniiih 
"anted la putch»M U« Cowijvnny mnriglH oul considered the asking |iri« of £100 1)00 to be 
i"tc«ssive. ((i:| llowcxor in IMS G.ClSmilU & Co, Lul. bccnroc I tic <jk owners of the firm 
tihen ihey purchased the rcraninlng 20.17J shares ul £2 per shnrt. iMl This ouilny of X-)D 746 
wjs a jiremiun' jirire lo |iny considering Hint I lie estimated mnrket value vm  10 shillings pci 
share. |(>3| Rut the apjsircm motiwillon was llml Impcrinl liuiMings was o company wli.iv to- 
m'Is ihal would appreciate in value fr.-ui year lo year. [6-1) Furthermore (he purchase of the 
.iilditiimal ol'ficc s|Mcc may haw Wen linked to the expansion of sugar wholesaling consequent 
upon the increase in  sugar output. By 1938 the Company was csiimiKcd to be worth at least 
ElVtiinX) ||>S1, which vindicates CO.Smith's decision.
Nnliil Cmn; lij- l’ro d u c ls Lliutiiid
In I'JIjlhe Halal Cane Uy Product; Ltd. was fioM.ud vntiv a tupiuil o( 123 000, subscciticmtyin- 
creased to £130 000 in 1'JIH. |66| The Company was established lo cxuatl wm troro sugnr- 
t.mc liul diversified into the pmiiuclion of nlcohol molar fuel and intlusf rioj alcohol, [(ill 
CCi,Smilh & Co. Ltd. were involved with the Itrm from the Inception allhougli they only held 
J 049 shares. |(iS| Natnl Cane Uy-Products was not a profitnbte concern and first declared a 
dMdend in 1937. |fi9| Smith’s holding in I lie firm remained low and lit 1940 amounted to only 
4 shares. [70] In view of the Company’s performimcc this appears to have been a wise dc- 
vismii M-fJ pnssibly Jue to C.fi.Srailh's Mief that the eoncern was badly managed. (71 ]
tc) Milled Kiilurjirlses
The desire for new frontiers led C.CLSmilh to Invest In a  tiuraU u oC spucu ln& sven tures, out- 
lide  the  suyiir Industry, and ns a  result ihe  firm Itxsl approxim ately £76 OOfl.
iAl'rlcim Oil Mills
Afrlcim Oil Mills whs e.sluhlishcd in 10211 wilh n share capit.il of £56 250. |72| Tlic major 
Uiarcholdiirs were C-G.Smiili willi 33 000 shares and C G.Smith & Co. Lid. with 10 000 
shares. [73] The [irm also issued (lcl)cnlurcs of £20 000 and CG-Smillt & Co. Lid. were llic 
miijo.' suhscrihurs iviili £17 400, (74] The Company was form'd to manufaclurc edible oils and 
call le feed. |75| Howe>vr ihc first years operations resulted In a loss of £10 000. |7fi| Tills 
dcilcit was ascribcd to the problems experienced in obtaining raw materials and to llic in­
competence of the titan,njement. |77) The Issue of mismanagement wns one which confronted 
mosl undertakings wilh which C.G.Smith was associated. It appears to hnve been due to 
C.C).Smith's inability to supervise those in control and the realization by the management that 
Smith’s would come to their rescue if they encountered problems.
In an attempt to place Ihc firm on a profitable basts, they diversified into the manufacture of 
soap in 1923. (7S| The C 'any was, as a result of this change, able to minimize its 
losses. [TV) However this expansion brought African Oil Mills Into direct competition with 
Lever Brothers who resisted their encroachment by dropping soap prices, which reduced 
margins anti hcncc African Oil Mills profitability. (SOj The Board began to realize that they 
had ventured into a field In which they had no expertise and that the prospects for success 
were minimal. This led to the decision to sell the firm if a buyer could be found. [Sl| The 
minutes reveal their naively
/ll f/td l/me, they Ihoitghl il mis an enterprise that suggested agricultural development 
and C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd should be in ll. [82]
This highlights the failure of the directors to examine the business proposition properly prior 
to investing in il and can possibly be ascribed to C.G.Smith’s whimsical way of doing business.
In the late 1920s llie firm continued to flounder due to severe competition experienced in the 
soap market, presumably from Lever Brothers, [S3] The Board wanted to liquidate the vcn-
Ilure bin this would have mount thru CCi.Smiili & Co. Utl. would linve lost £22 non, excluding 
I heir share mill debenture holdings. |84| According to the Dunk Report:
Since ill? Ineqtiion of the Company every effort has been imitle to establish the busi­
ness mi a somnl ptQvtii basis, bin without success, and they have bad to face a heavy 
loss at the end of each financial year, with the result that the whole of the capital has 
been lost and their shams may be regarded as of no value. [85J
Furthermore the decision regarding the liquidation was complicated by the fuel that C.G.Sntith 
& Co. Ltd. had in the S years of the firms operation received £8 000 in selling commission and 
interest on Ihcir debenture holdings. [86) Therefore the Board resolved to leave the decision 
lo C.fl,Smith. [87] Smith in typical fashion attempted to turn the business around and ac­
quired the remaining 13 250 shares at 0,23d. per share. [88] This made African Oil Mills a 
wholly owned subsidiary of C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd. Howevei the Company continued to record 
losses and was sold for £10 000 in 1936. [S9| Selling soap on commission was outside Smith's 
normal business, but selling on commission was his business. It failed because Smith came up 
against a more formidable opponent than Hulctts in the form of Unilever. African Oil Mills 
had consumed opprmimaldy £75 7J2 provided by CG.Smith & Co. Ltd, Thus CC.Smiih's 
refusal lo abandon African Oil Mills in 1928 had cost a great deal of money and had not been 
in the best interests of C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd.
South African Condensed Milk Company Limited
In 1923 S.A.Condensed Milk Co. Ltd. was floated with a share capital of £20 000. [90] 
C.G.Smith purchased 4 850 shares in the firm in order lo obtain its selling agency, but did not 
blither to consult his Directors. [91] The Company was faced with the problem of having lo 
overcome the local preference for imported brands. [93] This wir exacerbated by the dumping 
of foreign condensed milk on the local market in 1924 which decreased the ventures pros­
pects. [94] In 1924 the share capital was increased by 10 000 shares • 2s.6d. paid up: and 
C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd. purchased 5 000 shares. |95| The Company made a profit of £2 300 In 
1925 which was utilized to reduce the value of the plant by II  500 and carried forward a
hiil.-mcc of 800, |%| This decision wus grcclcd wilh Imslility by CO.Smllh who bclievcJ dial a 
dividend should linvu Iwcn paid lo shareholders. |971 As » rcsull Ihc firm sold ils shares in
S.A. Condensed Milk Co. Lid in 1925. |<JS| Sr'lth sow nn i>pporlunily to sell on commission 
mid he was correct. Me sold when he did not receive the income he expcclcd.
Alins 1’vlroliitim I'rmlucts (I’ly.) Lid
In 1927 C.G.Smilh & Co. Lid. hccnmc llie agents for Albs Petroleum Products, :i subsidiary of 
ii Soviet petroleum firm. ]V9| The fuel was murketed lit Natal and Zululurd under tlie name of 
Arop. [100] However in the 1930s the Soviets felt that they could nurkvt the product them­
selves und the association with C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. censed. |tlil| The undertaking find 
resulted in a loss of £20 000 to C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. [ I02|
Vvyutiililc I'lbrc IVmlucts i>f South AMcn Ltd
In 1934 C.G^mith was approached with the idea of establishing a firm to produce paper pro­
ducts from bagasse. |I03] This led Smith to establish the firm in 1934. (104) C.G.Smilh whilst 
on a visit lo London discovered thnt the extraction of the residue sugar from bagasse had not 
been overcome and thus the venture could not succeed. |li)5] The project was abandoned and 
lire cmip.uiy never atltiallyofimtcti. flt)6j Smith sow/in oppcrlunily lo sell onolbcr sugnr by- 
pi.iducl, paper from bagasse. It failed as a result of technologicul ilifiicullies.
til) CG,Smith Sc Co. Ltd. Pension Fund
Smith saw the need for the distribution firm with its contacts to maintain stuff loyalty. Hence 
he established a fund in accordance with 'he trend in Britain. The development of private 
schemes in Britain began in ihe ISSOs nnd wus the result of n change in perceptions on the part 
of both employers and employees. [I07| The employers saw it as a means of retaining impor­
tant personnel who were essential to the preservation of the firms competitive advantage. |I08] 
Whilst employees viewed such schemes as nior secure than the old system of ex gratia pay­
ments and began to think of pension cover ns an essential part of an employment con­
tract. |I09| The self-managed funds wcie normally confined to the large firms who possessed 
the necessary technical skills lo administer the fund. [ 110| The smaller firms relied upon the
Insurance company tn manage ihu sclicittc mid hclwccn I lie 1930s nnil IVSOs, ihc major growth 
was in liisurauco managed schenics. [Ill]
In Soulli Africa il nppomM llial during llic inlcr-wnr years Ihc majority of cnmpanics llint pro- 
vlilcil rctircraeiu buncfils iliil so by mcniis of pnmden! funds or insured suporannuaiion 
fims.|U2| In a iirovideiK fund the cmplnycc mid employer made contributions which upon 
ruiircmcnt where pnid out in u lump sum. |H3| Tlie superannuation fund took the farm of a 
pension purchased an insurance company through the proceeds of endowment iissurnncc 
policies taken out on the life of an employee. |1I4]
C.Ci.Smith & Co. Ltd. was a leader in the establishment of pension funds, although it was 
preceded by the Union government, provincial government and mnny municipal funds. |1 L5| 
Furthermore the Natal Building Society Pension Fund and the Corner House Pension Fund 
were established in 1916 and 1925 respectively, 11161 The difficulty in establishing who 
preceded C.G.Smith & Co. Ud. is due to the fact that pension funds were only first registered 
in 1958 liy the Registrar of Pension Funds, |117| However Smith’s appear to have been atypi­
cal In that they operuted their own fund rather than getting an Insurance company to manage it 
for them The firm's sugar companies and shipping interests did use insured superannuation 
funds. [1181 This was perhaps because the burden of administration and investment then fell 
upon the insurance company,
C.Ci-Smith first raised the issue of the need for a retirement fund for staff In 1918. [I I9| In 
l'J23 with the reorganisation of the firm it was dccided that n sum of £20 000 would be placed 
in a non-contributing pension fund. [I20j Pensions were to bo pnid on a annual basis and at 
the sole discretion of the Directors • effectively making it an ex gratia arrangement, [121] 
Thus Sntllh was aware of the trend towards such private funds In Britain. Furthermore he 
•villzcd that the establishment of such a scheme was essential to retaining the services of em­
ployees on a long-term basis. Smith stated:
Thai, in Ms miml, mis a stuitfaaoiy solution to il bccauM In a conc'crn iWi/t a Pen­
sion FiiiiiI il gim a sense ofsecurily to the cmplojws. [122]
Iii Jaiiunry 1928 u funlicr scheme wns csluhlislicd mid Milled llie C.G.Smiili & Co. Ud. Pen­
sion Fund. 1123| The scheme iipenued on a £ for X basis imd svus open io nil European cm- 
plojccs of I he firm. | I2-I| In order lo qualify for benefits an employee Imd to have ten years 
continuous service and the retirement iijjc was set at 00 years for mules and 55 years for fe­
males. (125] The fund started with 35 members and by 1933 this hud increased lo 37 members, 
of which 31 were male and 6 were female. [!26| In 1933 the total value of the fund was 
£10 956 and 45 per cent of the money was invested in sugar industry debentures. [127] The ac­
tuaries in their appraisal of the fund In that year, felt that too large a percentage of the 
resources had been committed leone industry. |128] Furthermore the fund had a deficiency 
of £3 754 because all members had paid contributions at a level rate of 5 per cent. (129) This 
highlighted the problem of administering a fund on a in-house basis without the proper ex-
In 1933 there was a disagreement amongst (he members as to tvhetlier they should hate a pen­
sion scheme or an insurance scheme. |130| This debate apparently arose because members 
feared that In the ease of sudden death the benefits to dependents from the fund would be loo 
small and an Insurance policy would offer better cover. [131| It may have also been the result 
of the actuaries report which found that the scheme was under funded. C.G.Smith maintained 
in front of the slaff that the fund offered the better prospects although he knew that '.his was 
incorrect. (132) The debate then fizzled out and the employees elected to remain in the fund, 
This shows that C.G.Smith was charismatic and people trusted him.
in June 1936 it was decided to amalgamate the two funds, namely the Pension Fund of 1923 
and the C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd. Pension Fund of 5928. (133) This enabled the firm to con­
solidate its pendun obligations and allowed it to wipe-out the deficiency of the 1928 fund. In 
terms of the agreement a sum of £20 792 wns incorporated from the 1923 fund and amal­
gamated fund became responsible for six pensions totalling £781 per annum. 1134) The money 
remained Invested In C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd, bearing interest of 5 percent per annum, (135)
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In Jiimmry 1028 u further scheme was csmblisheil imtl cnllcil llic C.CI.Smltli & Co. lid, Pen­
sion Piiiui. [1231 The scheme opermed on it X for X basis anil was open lo all lstirO|Xfan em­
ployees of I lie flrni, [12-11 In order lo i|unlify I'or benefit: an employee had to have ten years 
conllnuous service and the retirement age was set at 60 years for males and 55 years for lc- 
males, (I25| The fund started with 35 members and by 11)33 this had increased to 37 members, 
of which 31 were male and 6 were female. |126| In 1933 the total value of the fund was 
XU) 956 and 45 percent of the money was invested in sugar industry debentures, [127] The ac­
tuaries in their appraisal of the fund in that year, fell that loo large a percentage of the 
resources had been committed lo one Industry. |123| Furthermore I he fund had a deficiency 
of X3 754 because nil members had paid contributions at a level rate of S per cent. [ I29| This 
highlighted the problem of administering a fund on a in-house basis without the proper ex-
la I'>33 there was a disagreement amongst the members as to whether they should have a pen­
sion scheme or an Insurance scheme. [I30| This debate apparently arose because members 
feared that in the ease of sudden death the Ixtnefils to dependents from the fund would be too 
small and an insurance policy would offer better cover. [131] It may have also been the result 
of the actuaries report which found that the scheme was under funded. C.G.Smilh n nintiiined 
in front of the staff that the fund offered the better prospects although he knew that this was 
incorrect, j 132) The debate then fizzled out and the employees elected to remain in the fund. 
This shows that C G.Smith was charismatic and people trusted him,
In June 1936 it was decided to amalgamate the two funds, namely the Pension Fund of 1923 
mid Ihc C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd, Pension Fund of 1928. [133] This enabled the firm lo eon- 
‘olid.ite its pension obligations and allowed It lo wipe-out the deficiency of the 1928 fund. In 
terms nf the agreement a sum of X20 792 was incorporated from the 1923 fund and amal­
gamated fund became responsible for six pensions totalling X781 per annum. [ 134) The money 
remained Invested In C.G.Smilh & Co. Lid. bearing Interest of 5 per cent per annum. [ 135|
Iii 1938 the fund »:is again suhjucttid to an aclunrics vttluullon. [136] Tim value of the fund 
had increased to £44 786, including I tic lonn of £20 000 to C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. 1137] The lit- 
wstracnis had been diversified to the satisfaction of the actuaries; with £14 170 invcsled in 
mortgage debentures, £5 552 In Union loun ecrlirictilcs and i'3 955 in Government and 
Municipal Slocks, f I3S| The fund now had 39 members and was regarded as being in a strong 
financial position. 1139| The fund continued to grow in strength and by 1940 had n netl value 
ol'£52l09.[lJ0|
The C.G.smith Pension Fund was important for two reasons. First, it showed that C.G.Smith 
kept up with business trends in Britain and realized the importance of retaining sloft on a long 
term basis. Secondly, the fund was atypical In South Africa during the inter-war years, us most 
firms preferred provident or superannuation funds.
Coiiclusitin
C.C.Smith & Co. Ud. ticcame a very successful enterprise Ixlwccn 1910 ami J93P. The core 
of the business was selling sugar on a commission basis. The major part of the profits in the 
inter-war period also accrued from this commodity wholesaling, a market which few others 
identified or exploited as well as C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd, It was a business in which personal 
contacts were so important and could make the difference between success and failure. 
Smith's dominance of the distribution of sugar can be ascribed to his contacts with the major 
south coast sugar interests, namely those of the Reynolds, the Crookes and Pearces, The In­
crease in production meant there was a need for increasing quantities of working capital. This 
need was met by the overdraft facilities granted by the Standard Bank.
The need for government support came in the 1930s, and protection for the sugar industry 
rose from 3s.6d. per 100 lb, in 1910 to ICs.ld. per 100 lb. in 1932, an increase of 359 per cent in 
22 years. [141] Dealing in a primary commodity was a high risk business until the government 
stepped in to manage lie market in 1936. This elTcclivcly meant that the Union was a captive 
market for the local industry and that the Company was able to engage profitably In sugar 
wholesaling, Without Government assistance and protection for the Industry, this would have
been much more ilifficull, Ihmigli mi iloulu Smillis wholesaling liilcms would hnve been ap­
plied lu impiirlcd sutinr.
C'.d.Smith remained nl llic helm llirouglioin ihc period and this meant dial the management 
of the business was not septirsilcd from the ownership. Smith in this respect was similar to 
American retail tycoons who nlso did not separate ownership from control. [142] The respon­
sibility for strategy and policy implementation were confused and not clearly demarcated. [l-OI 
Short-term gains were often preferred to long-term growth and stability to the detriment of 
the firm. Staff loyally was ensured by the pension scheme and stock options, These Innova­
tions placed the firm at the forefront of change in the South African business community.
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The Umzim kulu Sugar C om pany Limited
Introduction
C.G.Smilk's and hier C.G.Smilli *  Co, Lid's, involvement in Umzimkulu extended over o pe­
riod of 36 years between I KM and 1940. This is o simly in mismanagement over a long period 
• mismanagement at the production level and at the board level. The dominant personality of 
C.G.Smlth coupled with his determination to make the company work led to the eventual 
profitability of the firm. The a bilily to depend upon C.G.Smith <1 Co. Ltd. allowed the firm to 
survive and eventually prosper, something that without recall to the tatter's financial resources 
would tiovc been impossible,
Sugar-cane hod been grown commercially on the northern bonk of the Umlimkulu river from 
IMS by Archibald Sinclair. [Ij In 1898 the Umzimkulu Sugar Company Limited was estab­
lished under the chairmanship of J.C.Maydon to produce both sugar and tea. (2) The Compa­
ny established its mill, the most southerly sugar-cane mill in the world, on (he soutltem bonk of 
the Umrimktilo river some 5 Jrm from Port Sbepstone and 125 km from Durban. (3| However 
most of the sugar-cane was grown on the northern bank, necessitating the transporting of the 
cane across the river lo the mill a factor which was to cause considerable problems in Inter 
years. The Company did not prosper and wos reorganised and registered as the UmzimMu 
Estates Limftcd is 150f, [4J
itTic Earl}’Yews; I9W-I919
Umzlmkulu Eslaics Limi(c<l was !oun<icil in March 1904 with a share capital of £27 500 si h- 
sequcntly Increuscd to £32 000 and a debenture issue of C50 000. (5) The Company1'  major 
shareholders were j.C.Moydon with U 769 shores; J.W.Leuchars, with 5 714 shares; 
P.Rcynokls with 3200 shares and C.G.Smilh, with 2 500 shares. (6| C.G.Smith was already In­
volved in Ihc distribution of sugar and presumably bought into the business in order to have a 
foothold in the production side of the industry. The estate was backward and the large capital 
base provide by the reorganisation of the business in 1904 allowed the company to engage in 
extensive replanting and modernization. [7| In 1906 there were 2 504 acres under cane of 
which 2 171 acres had been planted since 1904, |8] The Directors decided to erect a suspen­
sion bridge across the Umumkulu river in order to alleviate the cane transport problems and 
this was completed by May 1907. [9|
Umtimkulu's Turnover, V 
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The Company continued its programme of upgrading and the area under cane was increased 
to 2 880 acres in 1908. The improvements to Ihc estate were reflected in the increasing 
amounts of sugar produced; produ 'km rose from 691 tons in 1904/05 to 788 tons in 1905/06, 
1400 tons in 1905/07 and reached 1 958 tons in 1907/08. [10] The poor return and intensive 
nature of tea cultivation led the company to abandon tea in 1908 and to concentrate solely 
upon sugar, [11] The improvements Had required the expenditure of large amounts of money

The scronii jirablcm was ihc result of Ihe extremely low level of llic Umzlmkulu river in ilie 
19if>/17 senson whidi mciml Ihul Ihe wolcr was full of impurities ihm dogged the lubes and 
piping of the boilers In llie mill, 1191 This led to a delmic from Jnnuury 1917 amonysl the 
Board over the removal of the factory to a site on the Umtcnlweni river. |2I)| The proposal 
would give them ihc added ndvnnlnge of direct aeccss lo Ihe railway line anil would cnalilu ’he 
Company lo obtain extra cane from planters along ike Ihc. /2I/ The dvbaie tonlimici' into 
April wilhCti-Smilh pre««ring ilw dlrcdws lo/clocatc the mill. According lo the minutes:
C.CSnmh sioial llial he had not much of a haliling i/i J/ic Company bul he n-tmld 
increase his holding if ihert w t  a proper schcme for the raising of capital anil 
removal of the mill. [22]
However, ihe proposal floundered keause of the problems, given Ihc record of iht concern, 
2«iKialcd with the raising of Ihe (K.ec.tiary capita!, a! approximately 1:2ft tXM in 115(11X1. |2.'| 
Furthermore, il wns fell ihal ihe Board had overreacted and that in the 20 years of operation 
on the Umzlmkulu site there had been relatively little expenditure as ii result ot li iml out 
boilers from impurities in the water. |24|
These problems and their inability lo resolve them led the Bmird to decide unanimously lo of­
fer the Company lo Reynolds Brothers Limited in July 1717 (25|, wit It Rcynokk Brothers idl­
ing over the Estate and mill as a going concern, paying for Ihc shares ,v par and paying off the 
debentures. |2<5| Howciur Ihu negotiations broke down in October 1917 because Reynolds 
Brothers fell I hat the price was loo high for the firm to lie a viable business proposition. |27| 
The non-profitability of the concern, together with the associated problems of low sugar pro­
duction, bnd management and the water supply, led to Ihe eventual disposal of the business. 
In April 1919 the Unulmkulu Estates Limited was put up for auction and purchased by
;Pose 8}
Reynolds Brothers Limited fnr £111600. |28| C.G,Smith Co. Ltd. then purchased the com­
pany from Rcynokb Beolbarscm lhc30 June at cost price. ]29| There is no mention of tin unc­
tion in the bourii minifies of l i  April 1919. It if simply slated that Reynolds Brothers sis 
lioUlers of 31 691 shares, the remnming 309 sbarei being purl of u deceased estate, had de­
cided to voluntarily wind up the company, (30) Tfce acquisition nf the firm by Reynolds 
Brothers in 1919 appears to be a contradiction of their 1917 decision, particularly os they paid 
-in additional £29 000 For the firm. However, F.Rcytiofds was a board member of C.GSmilh 
& Co. Lid, and a perioniil friend of CG-Smilh. The sale of the company lo C.GSntilh & 
Co.Ud. within monthi of the purchase indicates that the transaction wits entered into on be­
half of C.G.Smlth, in order to out manoeuvre Maydon and the other board members.








The finaneiiil position of the company between 1914 and 1919 remained precarious. In 1915 
the low turnover led to a loss of £3 f/i2 which, combined with the previous years loss of £3 870, 
left the company with a debit balance of £7 532. In the 1915/16 season there was n marked in­
crease In turnover and the company recorded a profit of £11 459, allowing the accumulated 
losses to be written off, and leaving a net profit of £3 927. The reduction in profits In 1917 was 
a result of water problems. In the following year turnover dropped as a result of the poor con- 
illlion of the cane and increased maintenance costs amounting to £5 744 that resulted in n loss 
of £3866. In 1919 Ihc maintenance costs of £11716 led to losses despite the highest turnover 
In ils history.
The Lean Years: 1920-1939
The ncquisilion of Umzimkulu Eslalcs by C.G.Smilh & Co. Ud. was not endorsed by all the 
directors. Frank Reynolds, in particular, felt lhal il was n burden ond should be sold. The
Sir Frank Reynolds was of ihe opinion that, as a swig concent, Jmtimkuiu is not 
goiJigio be a success, mil the best course mxtltf be lo rect/ise tfa assea. (32J
In an attempt to forcslnll Reynolds’ prediction and lo place I be firm In a profitable position, 
the freehold land amatmitng lo 3 393 acres was sold ic soldiers who returned from World War 
One. |33| The reduflton of uxpcns&g incurred, would enable the company 10 concent rote us 
resources upon the icsscbold land and the mill. This rationalization increased confidence and 
C.G-Smilbsoid ol the Board meeting of 27 Janmiry 1920:
Prcspccts next year m'i/i control exercised by S.F.Cmokcs, were distinafy briglu. [34|
However the problems of processing sufficient cane to reach breakeven point continued lo 
plague the firm. C.G.Smilh then indicated that the firm was going to sell Umzimkulu Estates 
and in an apparent contradiction of his previous statemenls said:
He would impose at the next meeting to hvt rid of the factory either to the p/anters or 
to anybody who will deal with il and finish with it as far as CG.Smitlt are concerned.
They had never any Intention of holding It. |35|
C.C,Smith's whimsical way of buying and selling suggests lhal be was a difficult colleague and 
that his business methods were debatable • an<l not verycfTsricni,
x -  v
i - S On ibc 31 March 1921 ihc Umv.imkulu Esulcs, compriiing llic leasehold land and ihc mill, 
was sold for Ihc sum of £50 0(10, |30| A new company was formed called The Umzimkulu 
Sugar Company Llmilcd, with a capital of WO 000 and a debenture issue of £20 000. (371 
C.G.Smilh & Co, Lid. received 35 000 shares and the entire debenture issue in view of the pur­
chase price, the remaining 5 000 shares being subscribed for by the planters at Umnint- 
kulu. [38| The 35 000 shares were then sold to CG-Smith (in his private capacity), F.Bnmskill 
and N.McKcnzic for £30 000, divided equally amongst them. [39] The involvement of 
C.ti.Smilb Co. Lid. remained considerable however, as in addition to the debentures, the 
firm was owed £35 000 by the returned soldiers who had purchased the freehold land. (40| 
Clearly, C.GSmith had a inherent faith in the estate with which he had been associated since 
1904, a belief his fellow directors did not share. He therefore continued his association with 
Umzimkulu in his private capacity.
The formation of the new company under private management did not revive the firms for­
tunes and it remained In a difficult financial position, The Standard Bank Inspection Report
II would appear that Ihc Bank has provided most, if not all, of the actual cash re­
quired for the Company’s operations. I think the Company is leaning loo heavily on 
the Bank for assistance, [41]
in 1924, C.GSmith was himsctl ,'lso of the opinion that Umzimkulu had not performed up to 
expectations. (42) Smith wanted Reynolds Brothers to acquire the firm and a committee was 
appointed to Investigate the possibility, but nothing came of the proposal. [43] In July 1924, 
the majority of the shares held by the planters reverted to GG.Smllh & Co. Ltd. as a result of 
the planters inability to pay for them. [44| H.Brunsklll, one of the founders, was also forced
through financial difnculilcs lo ruturu his shares. {45) This highlights! the fiiilure of the ex- 
soJillcr sclllcmcnt ichemc with which both C O,Smith & Co. Lid. and The Umzimkulu Sugar 
Comjiiiny Lid, hnd assisted lo the best of their nbiiity. |46| By 1925 the planters’ debts lo 
C.G.Smith & Co. Lid. exceeded £40000 [47|, and cvcntuiilly grew lo approximately £59 000 in 
1926. |48| The mnrginnlity of the estme meant that it had to be well managed but the planters 
were unable lo produce good quality enne and this weakened the firm's position. According lo 
ihe Bank Inspection Report:
The company has W  an unsuccessful cukct and their future prospects do not ap­
pear to be veiy promising as their properly, which situated near Port Skepstotie, it 
rathe' too far south to groiv sugar with success, especially iff moderate or low 
prices. |49]
The Board realized (tint for i/ic Company lobe profilablc, the freehold land would have lo be 
re-ncquircd from the pknters. (50) The cane would otherwise remain sub-standard and this in 
(urn would caminuc lo reduce the profitability of the milling operations. 151| In order to fi­
nance jbe acquisition of the freehold land, the share capital of the firm was increased lo 
£55 OQO In the course of 1927. The major shareholders were C.GSmith & Co. Ltd. with 30 966 
shares; C.G.Sinilh with 12 367 shares and N.McKenzic, with the remaining 11 667 shares. [52| 
In 1928, CO.Smllh transferred his personal shares lo GG.Smith & Co. Ltd. which increased 
ihe lalter’s holding to 43 333 shares or 79 per cent of the total issue, [53] The firm was how­
ever still short of money and the capital was expanded lo £80 000, CG,Smith & Co. Ltd. hold­
ing 76 000 shares and N.McKenzic, 4 000 shares. |54] McKenzie’s holding was acquired by 
CO.Smilh & Co. Ltd. in the early 1930s, resulting In Umzimkulu becoming it wholly owned 
subsidiary, (55|
The problems of sustaining Ihe flow of cane lo the mil! persisted as the suspension bridge 
could only carry between 400 and 500 ions of cane per day. (J6| This mean! (bill Ihe
profitability of the concern was severely limited, as it had been throughout the firms history, by 
the siting of the mill on the south bank of the Utnzimkulu river, This was exacerbated in 1931 
when the bridge was destroyed by floods and a temporary causeway had to bo used until 1933 
when reconstruction was completed. |57|
The Company's position improved in the 1932/33 season as a result of Increased cone yields 
on the estate which allowed the mill to produce more sugar. [S8] This it appears was the result 
of the company purchasing the land formerly held by the ex-soldiers. The return to 
profitability led CG.Smith to say in 1933 that:
He also wished to pay tribute to the management, under Ihe control of Mr Cheadle, 
for the good results achieved. (59/
However the prosperity did net continue and in 1936 there were again complaints about the 
mismanagement of the estate. CG-Smith stated:
Our experience a! Unmmkuiu has made it the Gndcrctla of all the factories. There Is 
uol another estate in Natal that has been so badly and vitally mismanaged. (60)
The problem could not simply be ascribed to the management at Utnzimkulu: the board was 
equally responsible for the state of the company. Cane had been planted on inferior land 
which had become exhausted and fertilizer hud not been used on the fields until 1934, |G1| 
The Board hud never supervised or checked on operations and os a result there was 831 acres 
of cane in the 3rd and 4tU ratoon. |62| This incompetence was perhaps the result of knowing 
that if the firm was In a fix, they would be bailed out by CG.Smith A Co. Ltd. C.G.Smilh 
summarized the position well when he said:
Page 90
All along wc haw been yw/ig il another chance'. II is all a mistake- There should be 
no such tiling as 4th ratoons at Umilmkulu. I do not care if you say It gives you 20 
tons iter acre onc;ear, them should be nothing done after the 3rd ratoon but plough­
ing out and replanting, WAamcmwtiw/tofti ISycrnipht m a t a confession to 
have to make if he had to sell the placel [631
The failure to pursue a yidgrnmmc of replanting meant iliat the average return for (he 
1936/37 season was onty 12 tons of canc per were, compared lo the industry average of 21,2 
ions of cane per acre in 1935. [64| The local management of Umzlmkulu responded to the 
crititism concerning the low returns and standard of management by arguing that it was the 
result of locusts and the severe drought experienced. [65) Furthermore, Mr Cheadlc pointed 
out that when he took control is 192-1 the yield per aero was 10,7 tons and this had been In­
creased to 20 tons per acre in 1934, |6fi] Clearly, there Is some merit in this argument but the 
fact that the estate had cane which was IS years old, indicates lhat Cheadlc had been 
negligent,
The return per acre was also hindered by the large amount of Uba still in production which 
provided a lower yield than the new varieties. In the 1936/37 and 1937/38 seasons, the Com­
pany replanted a total of 1346 acres with the Co.281 and Co,290 cane varieties [67!, whilst 
overall between 1936 and i936 a total of 2 500 atrc.i was replanted. (63] This programme of 
renewal insured the continued viability of the firm but, raised the problem i)f the crop valua­
tion which stood at £49 000 in 1936, n gross wcr valuation, |69| Therefore the replanting was 
undertaken without being capitalized in lhe crop account and In 1939 wits estimated at £49154 
for 5 600 acres, The unsuitable land tens taken out ol production. |7DJ
The production of sugar at Umzlmkulu increased by 346,2 per cent between 1922 and 1940,
I. PI] The productivity ('Filicwilliin [he industry ns a whole, produtiic 
estate was therefore markedly lower [hi 
mcni. Afler the revelations of 1936, the firm's 0|>cralions improved continuously and this was 
rcfieeled in the improved production figures which impacted poslliveJy upon profits,
siting of the mill. The firm's
1933 when the company produced a record of 7 023 tons of sugar, the profit of wiiich was used 
to reduce the accumulated loss from £21 935 to £9 379. The position improved front 1936 with 
the extensive replanting programme and this made a major contribution to the large profits re-
i of sugar in the local market without any export oblige.
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Umzimkulu wai for most of ils history a 'Cinderella* Company, although it did become u 
profitable conccrn in the late 1930s, This tenacity of C.G.Smith is shown by his refusal lo 
abandon Umzimkulu In spile of adversity. He was instrumental in ensuring that C.G.Smith & 
Co. Lid. retained Umzimkulu once they had acquired the entire shore capital In the early 
1930s, perhaps to the detriment of C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd, Lord Lcvcrhulme also purchased 
concerns which did not always help Lever Brothers; for example, Mae Fisheries lo help unem­
ployed fishermen. [75)
The crucial factor with regard to the company’s difficulties was the mismanagement of ihc 
firm »s a result of the neglect of both the local management and I he BohnI. CbcadJc at Die
-• . i '•.-i-' . ' •
proiiuclion level railed to undertake systematic replanting of the cane. The Board was ex­
cessive in its delegation of authority. This highlight- TG.Smith's preparedness to delegate 
authority together with his inability to suuervisc those in control unit this nearly led to the 
firms bankruptcy.
Um?imkuiu's survival can be ascribed to its association with C.G,Smith & Co. Ltd. which al­
lowed It access to financial resources that it would otherwise not have obtained, it was 
permitted through this linkage to recover front mistakes that, without such recourse, would 
have led to its closure.
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CHAPTER 6 
T h e  G le d h o w -C h a k a ’s K ra a l  S u g a r  C o m p an y  
Lim ited
Introduction
CG.Smith and C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd. were in' !v 1 m v h,r unsuaissfiil1 /' 
llic Chako's Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd., the Glcii'.i'-- is •• l.' .i.iies Ltd- e.i f . N-,-.. |../ 
Estates (Pty) Ltd. In 1934 these marginal bmi'icn were m- rgcd in I irm ifce GJftlbow- 
Chnka's Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd. which proved to be a «ei/ profiiv' , -’u,.
Cluiku’a Kraul Sugar Company Umlled: 1916-tiyv
The Cheka’s Kraal Sugar Company Limited wis formcJ in 2915, wiili a share copiial uf 
115 000. |1] The major shareholder: were WL,Rcynok' -wNh 7 CTO jhirc*; CG-Smilh & Co. 
Ltd. with 4 800 shiirrs; Reynolds BrMhcrs Ltd. wiik l$IK>shai<M .inti Um i^mkulu Estates l.td. 
with 1050 shares. |2j The company was formed to acqukv the mill on the Oakland: Estate rn 
Umhlali, owned by H.LRcynolds. (3| Chaka's Kraal was purely a milling concern with ii» 
plantations of Its own. |4|
In 1919 it wai dctided to move the mill lurcher away from tlit' Umlilnli river un;l |/ 'nvcafe 
the mill capacity from 1 500 tons to 5000 tons of sugar pcrssawn. |5J TSIs expansion was 
financed through the enlargement of the company’s capita) to £35 000; CG.&imlh & Co. Ltd. 
purchased 10000 shares and K.LRcynolds, (he former cwwr, purchased 10 0f< ,ih»rcs.|6] A 
debenture issue oft25000 was niso rnlsi I (7|
However, (he firm was plagued by a cane shortage which reduced its profitability. In the 
1920/21 season the company made a loss of £15 907 because there were only 10 days of proper 
crushing throughout lire season, as a result of the shortage of cane. [81 Furthermore, the 
relocation nnd expansion of the mill had been financed by a loan of £4U 732 from CO.Smith & 
Co. Ltd, [91 Chaka’s Kraal was faced with a financial crisis and according to the minutes:
CG. siated it teemed IB him, fw n a proper business atpca theftm’ should be liqui­
dated, but rterv i«zr <r cbsnec of rarievi»g ike position... jlOJ
C.G.Smllh proposed to the Board that the shareholders should abandon their shares to 
C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. (Ill There was general opposition to this idea amongst the directors 
and a counter proposal was made that the shares should only bo pledged. [12| This idea was 
however rejected by C.G.Smilh. [13] The position of Chaka's Kraal was hopeless without the 
support of C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. and the firm would have been forced into liquidation; 
Smith's would then have been able to be' ' la September 1921 all the shares of Chaka's 
Kraal were abandoned by the other shareholders to GG.Smilb & Co. Ltd. [14]
Smith's now the sole shareholders, embarked upon a bold reorganisations! programme. First, 
Chaka's Kraal and Addison Brothers-Glcdhow mill were in close proximity to each other, and 
were working part-time because of insufficient cane. The Chaka’s Kraal mill was closed down 
and the cane redirected to the Gledhow factory. |15| The cone was delivered to Chaka's Kraal 
and then transported to Gledhow, with the latter paying for the loading and railage costs. [ 16) 
This agreement was continued is the 1921/22 and 1922/23 seasons. [17)
Secondly, the programme of tramline development initiated in 1920 to encourage farmers to 
plant sugar-cane and thereby solve the firms cane supply problems, was expanded. The
tv
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original idea had been lo build a line of approximately U km, (18| In 1924 ihc Iramlinu system 
consislcd of a 8 km line along the Elcli Valley and n 13 km line across Ihc Urahloli river lo the 
Compensation flats |19|, at a estimated cost of £50 000. |20| Tins gave Chuka's Kraal access lo 
9000 acres of cane land. (2i| The planters paid between 2s,Od. and 2s.Cd, per ion of cone, tie- 
pendent upon I lie dismncc, for Ihc use of the line, [22] The tramline system was however 
plagued by servitude problems which were only resolved in 1924 with the purchase of the Oak- 
lands Estate, consisting of 959 acres of land with 740 acres under cane, for £27 OOtl. [23] In 
1928 there were 29 km of tramlines which eventually provided 12 000 acres of enne, |24]
Chaka's Kraal as a result of the factory expansion, tramline development and the purchase of 
the Oakland* Estate, was heavily indebted. This was compounded by the debenture issue of 
£25 000 which fell due In December 1925. (25] The Board decided to utilize this opportunity 
to consolidate ihc firms liabilities which in addition to the debentures, included an overdraft of 
ISO 000 from the Standard Bank. |26] A new debenture issue of £75 UUO was floated In order 
to unify the debts. |27| However this did not solve Chaka's Kraal; financial problems and Ihc 
Standard Bank report of I926slalcd:
f # .
77ic position of ihe Company, is lie 
icli the whole capital has been lost
er wtsatisfaclo'y, as on a fair w 
/here is a large deficiency. (28]
The Company's financial position remained precarious in Ibe lulc 1920s due to Ihe low sugar 
price and bad management. This led Ihc Board to endorse a proposal in 1927, to incorporate 
Chaka's Kraal into the lllovo Sugar Estates Limited. [29] However this merger was abandon­
ed because it would have required the investment of large sums of money in lllovo. [30] Clear­
ly the Board was attempting to recover Us losses and certainly did not want to Invest more
in !93l) Chaks's Krpnl wss placed In a crisis siluollon when llic firm rccoriiud o loss of 
.C21 775. |31) This loss wtis jsctibcd by the Gnard to the local monagemems incompelcncc and 
led lo ihc dismUsiil of the manager. [32] H appears thal ihcrc was a shortage of competent 
personnel but the company never thought of undertaking training progrnmmes. Similarly to 
Umzirnkulu, bad management was the result of knowing that when the firm was in trouble 
they would be rescued by C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. Furthermore, the firm also owed C.G.Smith 
a  Co. Ltd. an amount of over £83 000. (33] Those Factors led lo o debate amongst the Board 
members as to whether Chaka’s Kraal needed lo be restructured or liquidated, a problem 
which had also been encountered at Umzimkulu. The closure of the company would hare 
meant a substantial financial loss to C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd. and would also hare been a major 
psychological blow. C.GSmith made his position clear when he $aM:
Miatew diffcrcna of opinion ilnrt msybs In connection ivilfi CUaka's Kraal, Die 
fact remains that we hare a factory Dwe and C.G.Smith <4 Co. have advanced owr 
a m m io M U l Up ihm factory. J34)
In 1930 the firm was reorganised with a share capital of £100 000, [35] The major shareholder 
was C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. with 99 265 shares and the remaining 735 shares were issued lo the 
Board members. [36] GG.Smith & Co. Ltd. were owed £83 323 by the company and this was 
reduced to £40 035 through the cancellation of the interest payments. (37] The original share 
capital of £35 000 was also written otf and this left a debit balance of £5 035 owing to 
Smith’s. (38] The new share Issue was then utilized to liquidate further liabilities amounting to 
£9! 195 and provided Chaka's Kraal with £8 805 for working capital. (39] Chaka’s Kraal had 
consumed £189 518 provided by C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd. This Illustrates oncc again that 
C.GSmilh's business methods were debatable find seldom in the best interests of CG.Smiih A
' t
Ftillowiiig llic restructuring, the company recorded modest profits of 13 065 in 1932 and £5 194 
in 1933.140) However, Chnko's Krnnl remained in n marginal position because of its reliance 
on planters for its cane and this dependence did not allow It to make substantial profits. In­
vestment in the business had been undertaken on a large scale and had possibly led to it being 
overcapitalized. Cheka's Kraal survived because of C.GSmilh's tenacity and the access it en­
joyed to the financial resources of C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd., perhaps to the detriment of the lat­
ter. In 1934 the firm was incorporated in the Gledhow-Chaka's Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd.
{llcdhow Sugar Estates Limited! 1916-1934
In 1920 FA Jdison sold the Addington Estate, comprising a mid and 12IXO acres of cone land 
to a private consortium for £200 000. (41 j The Company changed the name to Addison 
Brothers Limited and issued share capital to the value of £61 000 J42), divided equally among 
the six shareholders, namely C.G.Smilh, P.Rcynolds, CJ.Crookes, S.F.Crookcs, J.J.Crookes 
and W.Pearcc. |43| The firm also issued debentures to the value of £100 000, allocated to Ad­
dison in part payment of the purchase price. |44]
ic Company utilized 6 000 acre 
mntnmg 6 000 acres were lease 
m-cconomic factors led them to
: estate for its own planting operations |45], and the 
under a settlement scheme for returned soldiers. (46) 
ul the land when they were short of cane. This settle-
ic was probably undertaken at the requ­
ite at Umzlmkulu Estates Ltd. [47)
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Addison Brothers milling opcrnlions were hampered by a shortage 0/  cane which nos over, 
conic lo a degree by the cane obtained under agreement from Chaim's Kraal In (ho 1921/22 
and 1922/23 seasons. (48) However, the Company was unsucccssfiii ki t(s first tbrco years of 
operation and accumulated a deficit of £77 158 which effectively mean! Ihol the rapilol was 
lost. It Addison Brothers had not been highly geared Chen ti teoukl not have made losses; ll 
would liavr made small profits.
Addison Brothers was also badly managed, a problem which appears to have beset most firms 
with which C.G.Smith was associated. In I924 the Company's position wos further un­
dermined by accusations from planters that (hey had been Underpaid for cane delivered to the 
mill. The basis of these claims was that In 1921 [he seerage tonnage per truck was 3 tons 128 
lbs, in 1922 it decreased lo 2 tons 1143 lbs andm 1923 was 2 ions 1101 Ihs. (50) The difference 
between 1921 and 1922 was 1685 lbs, and between 1522 and 1923 ii was 1027 lbs. |5l) In Feb­
ruary 1924 an employee of the firm pleaded guilty in the Magistrate's Court to faking the 
weights on the welgh-bridge and cliilmed il had been done on the instructions of the local 
manager. |52j The Directors conducted tests on the wcigb-bridgo in June and concluded that 
the average discrepancy was 300 lbs per truck. |53f li was decided to relieve the manager of 
his duties. [541 The matter was seated wk* the Board agreed Id pay planters on the basis of 
300 lbs per truck for the 1923/24 season only. [55J
According to the minutes the Drrcctiirs decided in 1524 lo restructure the company in order 10 
reflect the full value of their inicafment. (55| However, il appears that the real reason for the 
reorganisation was to incrcast the working capita!. The Glcdbuw Sugar Estates Limited was 
formed with a equity of £189000(57], and subsequently increased to £246 000. |58) The 
debenture issue of £100 095 was retained by the new company. }59) The shades were divided 
equally amongst Che six members of (hcajwlkale. The Crookes' acquired F.Reynolds holding 
upon his death in 192? irad W.Pearcc sold his shares lo them in 1933. JG0) This meant that the
Pflgv 101
Crookes’ controlled 205 000 shares and C.G.Smilh, in his personal capacity, owned 41 000 
shores in Glcdhow.[(ill
The production ot sugar nl Gleilhow increased by 106,8 per cenl between 1925 and 1934, froni 
7 292 ions to 19 459 13ns, |62| This increase was limited to some exlent by the continued ennc 
shortage, but it wtis above the industry average of 142,5 per cent, [631 ’Hie increased produc­
tion impacted positively upon profits between 1927 and 1933, although they did fluciuaie, 
Glcdhow's financial position appears to be bettor chan k actually was because Ihc i  jjnulaicil 
deficit which was substantial, is not available, (64) The amalgemafion offered the prospect of a 
dean slate And the possibility of higher profits which the Director's naturally accepted,
filedhow'i Profit Si
TABLE 6.2 
urn on Share Capital, 1927-1933 |65|
Fliwncltil Capital DcDemres Projit








Note. • denotes figure unavailable.
New Li Mercy Estates (Ply) Limited: 1927-1934
In 1920 the La Mcrcy Sugar Estate Was purchased by a syndicate for £300 000. [661 However 
the Company went into liquidation as a result of mismanagement and was tmciioiicd ,,, Janu­
ary 1927. |67| It Was acquired for £80 000 by a consortium headed by C.G.Smilh, [68] The 
Company was restructured with a capital of £25 000 and renamed the New La Mercj Estates 
(Ply) Limited. [69| The major shareholders were C.G.Smilh with 9 200 shares; B,Erlkscn, a
/M - Y ' *  : r
' t
C.G^niilh & CO. Ltd with 2 600 shams, (70) to llie first I wo years of operation the Company 
mails modest profits omoumtng to XI 931 in 1928 anti G  043 in 1929. [91]
The Oonrtl consisting of C.G8milh, E.Eriksen and A,W,Dickens however realised Ihut the 
milling operations were too small la be profitable. |72| Therefore, when they were ap­
proached by the Tongaat Sugar Company Ltd, in May 1931, they agreed to sell (he mill anti 
freehold land amounting to 1700 acres for TO 500. (73) The firm became exclusively # plum­
ing concern, with three farms, namely HiHbrow, Hillindnlc and Eliphinslowc; and the cane in 
terms of the sale was sent to the Tongaat Sugar Co. Ltd. (74) The Eliphinslowc estate although 
managed as part of New La Mercy, was actually a separate company • Eliphinslowc Estates 
Limited. |75| In 1934 the Company became part of the amalgamation which resulted in the 
Glcdhow-Chnka's Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd.
The filcdfiow.Chufca's Kraal Sugar Company Limited: 1934-1940
The Oledhow-Chalra’s Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd. was established on the 13th June 1934 with an 
Issued share capital of £600000. |761 The major shareholders were the Glcdhow syndicate with 
383 000 shares; C.O,Smith & Co. Ltd. with 157 000 shares; the New La Mercy owners with 
23 OOG shares; A.W.Dickens with 9 500 shares and the Eliphinstowe owners with 3 500 
shares. [77] This meant that the Crookes’ controlled 57,9 per cent of the share issue or 
379 998sharesandCGSmith & Co. Ltd.controlled31.8percent or 193000shares.
The firm also issued debentures of 1200 000 and the major subscribers were Reynolds 
Brothers Lid, with £50 000, L.F.Rcynolds with £50 000 and M.Reynolds with £50 000. |78] 
This investment of £150 000 by the Reynolds’ was probably undertaken in order to help 
Smith’s and the Crookes’with Whom they co operated throughout the inlcr-wnr period,
The nmalgumntcd eompuny wus comprised of Iho filcdhow Sugar Estates Lid; lha Chaka’s 
Kraal Sugar Co. Lid.; ihc New La Mercy Estules (Ply) Ltd. and the Eliphinslowe Estates 
Ltd. [791 The firm possessed two mills, namely Chiika's Kraal and Glcdhow; 19 U4 acres of 
land, of which 15 080 acres were planted with cane and a tramline system of 128 km, [80] The 
merger provided the firm wilh more land on which lo expand cane production and enabled Ihc 
concern to distribute the cane supply so that both mills could work at full capacity, and offered 
the prospect of increased profits.
The prospects for the expansion of the cane growing aspects of the business were promising 
following the formation ofGledhow-Chaka’s Kranf. ftt December 1933 the Glcdhow syndicate 
hod begun a irrigation scheme of 2fW acres of sugar-cane which was cut in the 1934/35 season 
and produced an overage yield cf3S lota per acre. (81| In 1936 the average yield per acre, for 
the Industry as a wMc, was only 21,2 tons. |S2) Therefore the firm expanded the area of cane 
under irrigation rod by 1936 it encompassed 700 acres. |83) Furthermore, the project had only 
cost 23 000 because the Umvoti river flowed through the middle of the estate. [84) 1 he great 
jtolcmial of the scheme was severely limited as a result of the imposition of quotas within the 
sugar industry in 1936. [85j
The Company had to reformulate its strategy in the wake of the 1936 restrictions on produc­
tion. First, the firm Inherited fields which were exclusively planted with !h, low yielding Ubu 
cane variety; but by 1940 Ubn constituted only 25 per cent of the plantations. [36] The new 
varieties that were utilized in the replanting programme produced greater yields and this 
forced the firm to reduce the total area under cane. [87) Secondly, the concern now had un­
used land and this led lo a diversification in crops, By 1939 a total of95 000 Scllgna gum trees 
had been planted at Chaka’s Kraal and 16 000 at Gfedfiow. (88| A total of 350 seres of maize 
was also grown and was Used lo feed the labour force, thereby reducing overheads. [89] Third­
ly, the £200 000 debenture issue hod originally been floalcd to provide the company with stini-
money to crpnmf its planting into 
from Implementing Ihk enparwie tilize iho surplus
on for Ihc decline of profits in 1936 is 
t In the average price of sugar.
tislory of Clmkli’s Kfnal prie
Company relied
prafils. Glcdhow wna purchnscd ;
lion of the Glcdhow-Chaka's Kraal Sugar Co. Ud. whic i very profilablo venture.
. years to reach profilaWJily ss J  ihcn only,is
, very competent in their
BRA, C.G^milh & Co. Ltd., Minute Book, l<ViO/1925, p.IW.
Ibid., 18/12/1919, p.i9i Chaki's Kraal, Minute Book, 18/08/1920, p/28.
12/12/1919, p.17.
SBA, inspcciion ReporC, Dortian Branch, 4/11/1922-10/1/1923. p.15; BRA,C,G jnilih 
Sl Co, Ud, Minute Book, 15/02/1921, p.77, 
im ,  15/02/1921, p.7d.
BRA Chaki's Kraitl, Minute Book, 2/11/1921, p.43.
Ibid, 10/08/1931, p30.
SAS1A, 1925, p.120.
BRA, CG^mlth & Co. Ltd., Minute Book, 21/G8/L&3, p.251. 
SdSJA, 1925, p.L20,
URA, Chaku’s Kimil, Minute Book, d/iO/1924, p^ M.
BRA, C.Gjimlth & Co. Ltd., Minute Book, 30/09/1926, p.144.
24. COSSA, Ctmkn's Krnal, Minuic Book, 6/Wi928, SASY&kGD, 1933, Nn.4, p.240.
25. BRA, C.GSinilh & Co. Ud„ Minuic Book, 7/01/1926, p.tOO.
26. SBA, inspeclion Report, Durban Branch, 3VH5/1925-31/07/1925, p.13.
27. BRA, CO.Smith & Co, Ltd., Minuic Book, //01/1926. p.109; Chaka's Kraal, Minuic 
Book, !3/0]/l92C, p^l.
28. SBA, General Managers Office, Lcllcrs to London, Vol.78, 5/02/1926, p,440.
29. BRA, Chaka’s Kraal, Minuic Book, 5/01/1927, p. 129,
30. tlml., 23/02/1927, pp. 143-148.
31. COSSA, Chaka’s Kraul, Minuic Book, 25/09/1930, p83.
32. BRA, C.G8milh & Co. UJ„ Minute Book, 21/01/1931, p.56.
33. COSSA, Chaka's Kraal, Minute Book, 4/12/1930, p.93.
35. told.', 17/09/1931, p.il6.
37. Ibid., 4/12/1930, pp,93-96,
40. Ibid., S/09/1932, pp.127-128; BRA, C-G.Smilh & Co. Ud„ 1/06/1933, p.200.
41, Qtborn, op.dt,, 1964, p.J89; BRA, Addison Brothers Lid., Minuic Book, 26/02/1924,
42- SBA, Inspeclion Report, Durban Branch, 4/11/1922-10/01/1923, p.12.
43. Osborn, op.di., 1966, p.44.
44. BRA, C.OSmilh A Co. Ltd., Minuic Book, 27/01/1920, p.40.
45. SASYB&GO, 1930, No.I, p.93.
46. SASYMGD, 1931, No.2, p.210,
47. Sec Chapter S.
48. BRA, Chaka’s Kraal, Minute Book, 22/08/1923, p.25L
49. SBA, Inspection Report, Durban Branch, 4/11/1922-10/11/1923, pp.12-13; 14/12/1923- 
10/04/1924, p, 12.
50. BRA, Addison Brolhcrs Lid., Minuic Book, 4/03/1924, p,19.
52. /Wd., 6/03/1924, p.27.
53. Ibid., 16/01/1924, pp.51-54.
54. Ibid., p.55.
55. Ibid., 27/06/1924, p.78.
56. W .. 26/02/1924, pp. 10-11.
57. Ibid., 3/07/1924, p.83.
58. SBA, General Managers Office, Letlcrs 10 London, Vo).83,18/U/1927, p.757.
59. BRA, Addison Brolhcrs Ltd., Minuic Book, 3/07/1924, p.83.
60. COSSA, Chaka's Kraal, Minuic Book, 29/03/1934, p.154.
62. BRA, Addison Brothers Lid., Minuic Book, 20/5/1925, p.141: SASYB&GD, 1934, No.5,
63. See Table 3.7,
64. See SBA, General Managers Office, Lcllcrs lo London, does not provide comprehensive 
figures but docs sialc that Ihc accumulated debt was substantial.
65. SBA, Inspection Report, Durban Branch, 4/12/1933-26/02/1934, p.12; General Man­
agers Office, Letters 10 London, VolS3, 18/11/1927. p.7S7; Vol.89, 25/10/1929, p. 166; 
Vol.98, 23/12/1932, p,770.
66. BRA, C.GSmith & Co. Ud„ Minuic Book, 22/09/1927, p.210.
67. BRA, Chaka's Kraal, Minute Book, 23/02/1927, pp,144-145,
68. BRA, C.G.Smilh & Co. Ltd., op.cfi.
69. /i/d., 1/03/1928, p.236.
70. Ibid., 23/08/1929, pjdP
71. Ibid-, 23/0],'1928, p.MS; D/08/19%), p.%7.
72. Mil., 17/09/1931, p.76.
73. CGSSA, File 24, New U  Mercy Estates Ltd.
74. BRA, C.G.Srnith & Co. Lid., Minute Book, 1/06/1933, p.201.
75. CGSSA, Gicdhow-Chakn’s Kraal, Minute Book, 29/06/1934, p,12.
76. SASYB&GD, 1935, No.6, p.W.
77. CGSSA, Glcilhow.Chaka’s Kraal, Minute Book, 4/07/1934, pp.10-13.
78. IIM, |),14,
79. /Wii..pp.l0-13.
80. SASYB&GD, 1935, No.6, p.ldb.
81. CGSSA, Glcdhow-Chaka's Kraal, Minnie Book, %)/12/1934, p8S.
82. See Table 3.5.
83. CGSSA, Glcdhow-Chaka’s Kraal, Financial Statements, File I, Shareholders Meeting, 
22/5/1936, p.13.
85. See Chapter 3 for the details of the restriction in terms of the 1936 Sugar Act.
86. CGSSA, Glcdhow-Chaka's Kraal, Financial Statements, File I, Shareholders Meeting, 
20/8/1940, p.14.
87. Ibid, 15/06/1939, ppj,9.
88. ibid., Glcdhow-Chaka's Kraal, Minute Book, 22/02/1939, p.43.
Dfl! /1/d., 24/11/1938, p.23.
91. /Wd., 30/04/1939, p.53.




During ihe course of the 19lh Century, with ihc discovery of diamonds and gold, overland 
communications improved, cargo traffic increased and with it the demand for coastal shipping 
then attracted a large number of shipowners. In 1895, Durban was linked via a railway line to 
the V.'itwatcriirand |1| The increase in cargo was of such a magnitude that the deep-sea liners 
engaged in intcrmuoic.il iwde found it profitable to engage in coastal trade as well. In 1852 
ihe General Screw Steam Shipping Company of London, begnn a steam coaster service lo 
carry mail between Cape Town and Port Natal. (2| The IT' • shipment ol"40 tons of unrefined 
sugar was carried in 186! by the ninety ton ‘Natalie’ from Umkomass to Durban. |3| The 
saving which coasters offered the sugar planters of this particular area was substantial, 
amounting to £2 10s Od for each ton of sugar transported to Durban. [4| The service was, how­
ever, terminated within a couple of years.
In 1888 C.G-Smith went into business for himself and began buying and distributing sugar and 
cattle along the Natal coast. These business ventures required an effective distribution 
network which led to Smith's move into the coaster industry and to the formation, establish­
ment and adaptation of his coaster interests, which was a profitable business venture in the 
(filer-war years.
, which voted to support a shipping company if i
along tlic Natal: I by the prcvir
i of the'Penguin', a steamer of 2431
.by a number
the development of coastal
could not pass beneath them. |7| Sandbar
i became settled. The extension of agriculture as a result
sion of the railways and the high casts Involved in removing the sandbars meant 
lem was not tackled. Port Shcpstonc was restricted to vessels with a draft of 2 
in order in pass over the bar and Pori St Johns was eventually abandoned be COT! 
lem of crossing the sandbar.
retlislribulion of sugar from Durbar 
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by the importation of sugar from Mauritius which provided a profitable supplement tc
iaw an overall contraction in the coaster industry, with a downturn in 
sugar and entile, Smith’s survived through its involvement In the 
eve of World Wir One the coastal business was not particularly
In Utc 1520s the coastal shipping industry passed Ihrough u major crisis which forced a rudicol 
reorganisation of the induslry. First, ll suffered from the legacy of Ihc Sen Competitive Rull- 
wny Rates. These rates, firs! Introduced by (ha Cape Colonial OoverBmem, were retained by 
the Union Government under the jurisdiction of the South African Railways Administration 
from 1911. This legislation involved charging railway rates which were below tf.e shipping 
rotes for the coastwise movement of commodities. The initial reason for the policy was to 
utilise underutilised railway rolling-stock capacity. |12| In addition to lower rates, the railways 
continued to expand and improve services which meant that firms sent goods by rali in prefer­
ence to coasters. The railways transported high tariff freight, such as foodstuffs and liquor, 
leaving the coasters wilh the low tariff bulk cargo's of sugar and paper. This curtailed their ex­
pansion into other goods. The Sea Competitive Railway Rules applied until 1954 when they 
were abolished bccousc they Involved an uneconomical service that could no longer compete 
with road transport. The Sea Competitive Railway Rates were largely responsible for confin­
ing the coaster service to the transportation of sugar and paper in the period 1908 to 1964.
Secondly, the coaster industry suffered badly from tho general depression of the 1920s and 
1930s. The shipping depression was due to railway rales, foreign interlopers and the return of 
ships used In the war which meant a sudden surplus of ships and a consequent drop in freight 
rates, in 1918 the South African coasting fleet consisted of 12 ships. (13) Smith in the face of 
this adversity, streamlined his fleet by red [icing il from roar to two ships t y  1922, wilh the 
more economical 648-ton 'Karin' and 1200-ton ‘Kate1, purchased for £5 439 and £6 500 respec­
tively, replacing the 'Umzimvubu' and ‘Frontier', [14] Because of the increasing demand for 
sugar the firm expanded its business by offering a service to Port Elizabeth and Knysna In ad­
dition to the transportation of sugar undertaken by the ‘Karin’ between Durban and East 
London.
The coastal Industry was kept ulloat by the expansion of the sugar trade, especially to the Cape 
Province where the cannery and spirits's industries were located. In the 11 year period be-
en 1916/17 and 1926/27 ihe consumption of sugar by ihc mnnurucluring:
viability of Ihc coasting industry. |1S|
lise the sugar freight rotes. [161
During the 1920s Smith's involvement in regional trade continued, hut on a smaller scale. The 
•Kate1, in addition to carrying sugar on the coastal route, traded between the Indian Ocean is-
: dccline of sugar imports from Mauritius.
Although the livestock business had been the original motivation for the firm’s involvement In 
regional trade, in the 1920s Smith gave the livestock business to his manager and co-director 
ated upon the sugar business. This, coupled with the decline of 
' withdraw from regional trade by 1930 when the company ills-
G.P.Dcnhin 1191, and 
trade in general, led !
The Period of Unfair Compctltlun from I he Riillwiiys: 1927-19#
In 1027 Ihc consling inlcreslsof CG.Smilli & Co. Ltd. were separated from ihc pnrcnl cornpo­
ny to form n new firm. This was done bccausc uf the need for capital and a separate manage­
ment team to eater for its specific interests, Smith's Coasters (Pty) Ltd. was founded on the 
llth April 1927 with an issued share capital of £40 611. |20| Tlic major shnreholdcrs wore 
C.n.Smitli & Co. Lid. with 25 000 shares; Dreyfus & Co., Merchants, with 7 500 shares; 
Storm Si Co., shipping agents, with 6 000 shares and E.Erikscn, a mercham, with 2 000 
shares. [21] The shares were Issued to these firms because tfiey weie (he major clients of 
Smith's Coasters. The company commenced operations with two vessels, the 'Karin' and tliu 
'Kate'. The 'Karin', however, floundered ofi-Durban on the 22nd Octobcr 1P27 which resulted 
In a capital loss of £4 050. |22| Two vessels were added to the fleet in 1927, the 730-ton 
'llamcford' Md 'btca<!'. Both vessels had been O ships during World War One and were pur­
chased for £7 US and £6 010 respectively. [23] Smith’s withdrawal from regional trade meant 
that the firm concentrated exclusively on local trade which was predominantly the transporta­
tion of sugar. The small fleet of three vessels mainly transported sugar to the Capa ports, but 
the lack of return cargo reduced profitability. During 1928 and I92V the Kate' was laid up fur 
a total of sixteen months and then to avoid further losses the vessel was scuttled in 1930 which 
meant a loss of £9 114. [24| The Great Depression, together with railway rules, reduced the 
volume of cargo to such an extent that there was no need to replace either the 'Karin' or the
fn 1933 there wus an upturn as a result of the demand for sugar from the fruit canneries of the 
South Western C.ipe. |25] The sugar and paper bound for the Cape was carried by Smith's 
and African Coasters respectively In terms of a gentleman's agreement. [26] The expansion tif 
business in ihn mid lUSOs let. Stilth'!, Coasters to increase its capital base In order to acquire 
more ships. The Company Issued an additional 29 389 shares al 10 shillings a share, which 
yielded £14 694 towards financing Ihc acqalsilian of Iwn new shifts. (27| The major sub.
Pllgc till
sctibcrs to I he 1V35 Issue were C.O.Smilh & Co. Lid. wilh 9 333 shares; CGSmilh wilh 5 158 
shares; Dreyfus & Co. wilh 4 137 shores; Refineries tnvestmcnls with 3 Of® shares and 
Slorni A Co. wilh i 388 shares. |281 In 1937 a furthcrto 000 shores were issued, C.O.Smilh & 
Co. I,id. taking 9 809 shares; Dreyfus & Co. taking 3 325 shores; Storm & Co. taking 1774 
shares and C.G,Smith taking 1 474 shares, |29) The share capital of the company now 
amounted to £45 000 with 90 000 shares having been issued, The two new ships were the 
1 010-loti 'Nahoon' which cost £22977 and the 1010-ton 'Gamloos' which cost £27 596. |30| 
The ‘Nahoon’ commenced trading in 1936 and the ‘Gamloos’ in 1937. These two vessels were 
the first ships which the company had specially built. The ships were commissioned at the first 
real growth point in the coastal trade since 1914. |3l) The ships incorporated in their design 
easy loading, storage and unloading features following an overseas trend hitherto unknown in 
South Africa. [32j During the inter-war years there were seven coaster companies in South 
African waters operating sixteen coasters with a total tonnage of about 78® tons, (33J Throe 
companies handled the major share of the coastal trade, namely Thescn's Steamship Compa­
ny, African Coasters and Smith's Coasters. The South African Railways and Habours opera- 
led three ships for external trade, giving South Africa a total maritime tonnage of 221)00 tons 
in 1939.1341
However, this expansion of coastal shipping needs to be placed in perspective, For instance, 
the total South African tonnage in 1939 was less than the tonnage of one of the Union Castle 
mailships operating at the lime. This was because of the nature of the coastal cargoes as n 
result of the railway rates and the size of the market both of which restricted the growth of the 
South African maritime tonnage, In addition Smith's Coasters experienced a number of other 
problems at this time, First, even on the regular route to the Cape, the service was irregular 
and slow because the service speed of nine knots meant that delays could not be recouped. |35| 
Secondly, Smith’s Coasters experienced numerous and expensive engine problems with the
. spirit industries of the Cnpc. In the 
mfocluring dropped nnd Smith's expc
corresponded with a rise in 
the eofistrmplion of sugar b>
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Aid; See Richardson, C, S, 'Shipping Services a 
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If a long term view i .......... 1s taken for I he period 1927/28 to 1952/53, then it can be
after 1950 manufacturing’s consumption and Smith's profits show little linkage,
Conclusion
The Inlcrnolional commedily (ratio wei iulijcci to fundamcntul change in ihc inter-war period 
as a result of the t'nslabilily of primary product prices. International Intercourse was in­
creasingly subject to both bilateral and mullllaleral agreements in an attempt to provide 
stability, Production was out of step with demand and this overproduction crisis was ex- 
arcbuted by the technological Innovation in the developed nations daring the period. The 
inter-war period was characterized hy very slow growth In the 1920s and Kegnaltos in the
In this hostile environment the sugar trade was increasingly characterized by lurllT protection 
and preferential access agreements which compounded the industry's problems. The inability 
to obtain consensus amongst all the producers meant that sugar prices Cell dramatically in the 
Inlcr-war years. In contrast to the commodity trade in general, sugar experienced a price 
decline from 1920 until 1937. This crisis led to the International Sugar Agreement of 1937 
which was endorsed by all the producing and consuming nations. This agreement led to a 
price rise and to some stability within the industry.
Smrih Africa became a net exporter of sugar in the period although its contribution remained 
Insignificant In Ihe InlcrMltosal conlcxt; rising from 0,8 per cent of world production in 
1920/21 to 1,8 per cent In 1939/40, |l |  As occurred in other nations, the South African sugar 
industry was able to survive because of Gorentraciil intervention which provided It with pro­
tection and a captive home market. However in exchange for this consideration by Govern-
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sugar- The enptive home market allowed the indualry to financc its cxporl market which wns 
aided by il.t preferential access lo the British and Canadian markets. South Afrivi was to a 
large extent in.ujisicd from the instability which characterized the International sugar trade of
The main componcni of C.GJimifh & Co, Ud. business between 1910 and 1939 was sugar dis- 
tribution/whoksaiing and ihis aspcci of I he business alio provided the bulk of the company's 
profits. CO.Smith's personal friendship nilkfke major south coast sugar interests, namely the 
Reynoldses, the Crookes and Pearces ensured (hnt the firm i«ts rosined by these families to 
conduct their sugar sales. This relationship was strengthened through ihc sbareholdlngs of 
these families In C.G.Smith A Co. Ud. As a result of this influenec in ihc induslry, Smith en­
joyed a good relationship with the Standard Bank and was given extensive overdraft facilities 
which ensured the firm's survival In the depression years.
Smith retained control of the firm throughout the perir.l and this was possibly detrimental to 
the profitability of the firm, in particular, the diversification into non-sugar interests was 
motivated by his desire for new frontiers and often resulted in the firm losing money through 
these investments. However he was aware of the need to retain competent staff and offered 
them the opportunity to purchase shares and instituted a pension scheme which placed the 
firm at the forefront of change in the business community,
The association of C.G.Smith and C.G.Smith & Co. Ltd, with the Umzimkulu Sugar Co. Ltd, 
hrgWrghfs Ihc mismanagement of Ihc concern at both the production and board level. This in­
competence appears to Nave been due to CG.Smith's Inability to supervise those in control, 
and the knowledge at the pwieciion lav'd I hat C-GSmith & Co. Ltd, would bail them out 
when that encounleted financial difficulties.
Theinvolvemcnl of CG^mr'h & Co. Lid. in ibe Glcilhow • Chaka’s Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd- oncc 
again hlghllghk the mcompelcncc of C.G.Smiih is managing a pretlnction orientated conccm. 
Furlhcrmoru the amiilgnmutcd company bcramc a profileble vcnlurc because of the protec­
tion which the industry was granted by the Government.
The coasting interests uf the company were initially there to provide Fmith with a dislribuiion 
system for his other businesses, namely sugar wholesaling and cattle trading. In 1927 Smith's 
Coasters was formed because of the need for capita! and a separate management team to 
cater for its specific interests. Prior to 1940, the coasting business concentrated almost cxclu- 
jivcJy upon the local sugar trade and was one of the most successful ventures of C.GSmith &
C.O.Smith was a shrewd entrepreneur and was the buckbone of the business. He was Imbued 
with enthusiasm and adventurousness. Smith was alio B very domineering man and was al­
most always able to persuade the Board that his vision for Ibe business was the correct one. 
The firm as a result of his speculative ventures lost a great deal of money, However Smith’s 
autocratic manner appears to be a common characteristic of entrepreneurs. According lo 
Reader:
Founders of great business*!! rather than professional managers, who ore a different 
species ■ ore all autocrats- They Mill not tolerate opposition, power they mil share with 
nobcify, ami rivals an not allowed. [2)
Similarly to the American rMai! tycoons, Smith did not separate the ownership from the man­
agement of the business. He also purchased concerns which did not always help C.G.Smith & 
Co. Ltd. and In this rasped resembled Lorti Lcwirtitirttc. fi Appears lliai Smith was a maverick 
who was extremely lucky with regard to business.

























ttcgkler of Smith's Coaster FlMH 1IB9-1940
Year frame Tons Year
Acquired Solti
1889 SOMTSeit SO 1898
1896 UM2IMVU9U 150 1921
1397 FRONTIER 191 1920
1903 PENGUIN 243 IP06
1920 KARIN 648 1927
1920 KATE 1200 1930
1927 HOMEFORD 730 1946
1927 MEAD 730 1956
1936 NAHOON 1010 1961
1937 OAMTOOS 1010 1944
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